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This thesis analyses minority shareholder protection in common law and civil law 
systems. Principally, this is done by examining closely-held corporations created under 
Canadian, Ukrainian and German laws. It examines minority shareholder protection by 
critically analyzing voting and related rights, the right to information; withdrawal from 
the company, expulsion right, the dissolution of a company, derivative action and direct 
action. The thesis also summarizes problems in the civil law system that cannot be solved 
in favor of minority shareholders. In addition to the above-mentioned, it provides 
possible solutions to the problems of minority shareholder protection in the civil law 
system, that is, methods by which to increase protection for minority shareholders against 
the majority and/or directors. Specifically, it focuses on cumulative voting, common law 
director’s duties, derivative action and the oppression remedy. Moreover, this thesis 
analyzes the possibility of incorporating some institutions into civil law legislation and 
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Today, it is hard to imagine life without corporations1. Corporations have become 
more than artificial persons. They are the biggest employers, the biggest taxpayers and 
the biggest holders of assets in the world2.  In light of their importance to national and 
global economies, governments and influential non-governmental institutions should pay 
attention to their protection and the protection of their members. 
The central debates relating to corporate governance over the past century have 
asked: who should control the corporation and who should receive its profits? Who 
should be liable for its misconduct, who should carry the risk of its losses, and who 
should be protected? In this paper, these questions are examined in detail, and the case is 
made that the probable answer to all of these questions is the shareholders of a 
corporation.  
There are several reasons for this conclusion. The economic contribution that 
corporations make to society cannot be overstated. The profits generated by corporations 
are significant to tax revenue, economic growth and a country’s overall welfare. 
Corporations are principally governed by their shareholders and directors. Shareholders 
                                                 
1 In this thesis the terms corporation and company are used interchangeably. 
2 See, for example United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World 





invest money in a corporation with a view to receiving profits in the future and protection 
of their economic position is essential for investors. Therefore, in order to maintain 
investor confidence and increase investment, governments should make efforts to protect 
both majority and minority shareholders. 
Shareholders’ control over a corporation exists due to the rights they are granted 
by the corporation’s enabling statute and constating documents. But these rights are only 
as meaningful as the mechanisms in place to protect them. Although in many countries 
shareholders have significant legal rights, the realization of these rights in some situations 
is difficult and problematic. In regard to minority shareholders, the difficulty is due to the 
“Majority rule” principle which puts them in a disadvantaged position in comparison to 
majority shareholders. Challenges of how to protect minority shareholders from 
exploitation by the majority, how to protect shareholders from wealth extracts by 
directors, and how to provide real participation in corporate management to minority 
shareholders, are the most common problems in the modern regulation of corporate 
affairs. 
This thesis analyses minority shareholder protection in common law and civil law 
systems. Principally, this is done by examining closely-held corporations created under 
Canadian, German and Ukrainian laws. The reasons for the focus on closely held 




the aforementioned countries3. Second, there is no market for shares of such corporations, 
which puts a minority shareholder in the disadvantageous position of being unable to 
simply sell his or her shares. Third, from a theoretical point of view, it is easier to show 
protection for a minority in a closely-held corporation than in a widely-held corporation. 
Because of the large number of shareholders, the many remedies that exist are almost 
impossible to take advantage of because of the cost of doing so. Finally, a widely-held 
corporation has to fulfill security regulation requirements which provide more protection 
for shareholders than those of closely-held corporations. 
The reasons the three principal countries, Canada, Ukraine and Germany were 
selected for analysis as follows. First, it provides a comparison between the world’s two 
principal systems of law. Canada is a common law country, while Ukraine and Germany 
belong to the civil law family of nations. A substantial body of research indicates that 
common law countries offer superior shareholder protection4 when compared to civil law 
countries.5 Second, these countries have very different systems of shareholder protection. 
                                                 
3 According to the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, on March 1st 2011, 
1,301,495 entities were registered, 1,245,321 of which have the status of a legal entity, 
and 56,174 that do not. Of these, Limited Liability Companies (TOV) number 447,979. 
There are also 286,174 Private Enterprise, and 28,415 Joint Stock Companies. Regarding 
Germany, on January 1st 2005, “some 975,000 German commercial entities were 
organized as a GmbH”. In comparison with this number, the AG (Joint Stock Company) 
constitutes 15,000. See Klaus Muller, The GmbH: A Guide to the German Limited 
Liability Company, 3d ed (Germany: Beck; Kluwer Law International, 2006) at 4.  
4 See for example, R La Porta et al, “Law and Finance” (1998) 106 J Pol Econ 
1113. 
5 Udo Braendle, “Shareholder Protection in the USA and Germany – “Law and 




Canada has been recognized for having one of the best shareholder protection regimes in 
the world, whereas Ukraine and Germany are ranked among the worst, according to the 
World Bank’s ranking 6 . This ranking measures the strength of minority shareholder 
protection against directors’ misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. The indicators 
distinguish three dimensions of investor protections: transparency of related-party 
transactions; liability for self-dealing; and shareholders’ ability to sue officers and 
directors for misconduct. The data for the ranking come from a survey of corporate and 
securities lawyers and are based on securities regulations, company laws, civil procedure 
codes and court rules of evidence.7 
The task of this thesis is first to analyze legislation, case law and scholarly works 
on mechanisms of protection for minority shareholders in common law countries (mainly 
based on Canadian law), and in civil law countries (based on Ukrainian and German law). 
Second, based on theory and practice, the thesis seeks to provide an answer to the 
question which system offers superior protection to minority shareholders.  Finally, the 
thesis provides possible ways to deal with some of the deficiencies in the protection of 
minority shareholders in civil law countries.  
This thesis has five chapters. Chapter I is the introduction. Chapter II begins by 
posing the question why minority shareholders must be protected. It discusses the 
                                                 






significance of majority and minority shareholders and examines the possible advantages 
and disadvantages of having a controlling shareholder, and what the minority can expect 
from him/her. This chapter also pays attention to the main role of the corporation by 
examining the concepts of shareholder primacy and corporate social responsibility. It 
concludes with the argument that preference should be given to shareholder primacy. 
Chapter III considers shareholder protection in civil law countries based on 
Ukrainian and German law. This Chapter starts with a brief historical background to 
Ukraine and Germany, their corporate law, and general information on private companies 
established there. It then examines minority shareholder protection by critically analyzing 
voting and related rights, the right to information, withdrawal from the company, 
expulsion right, the dissolution of a company, derivative action (suit) and direct action. 
The chapter concludes by summarizing problems in the civil law system that cannot be 
solved in favor of minority shareholders. 
Chapter IV provides possible solutions to the problems of minority shareholder 
protection in civil law systems, that is, methods by which to increase protection for 
minority shareholders against the majority and/or directors. This chapter focuses on how 
cumulative voting, common law director’s duties, derivative action and the oppression 
remedy can help to achieve this objective. Moreover, it analyzes the possibility of 
incorporating these institutions into civil law legislation and considers obstacles to 




Part V concludes by summarizing the main ideas put across regarding minority 
shareholder protection, and argues that it is worth adopting some remedies from the 




CHAPTER II  
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES 
2.1 Why Do We Need to Protect Shareholders? 
In general, countries have a concern about investment. Investments produce 
workplaces and infrastructure (buildings, roads, networks and so forth), which eventually 
lead to higher tax revenue, and also positively reflect on the public image of a country.  
Each shareholder is an investor, no matter if he or she invests one dollar or several 
million dollars. That is why his or her position should be important to the company and to 
policy makers. In real life, however, because of the “majority rule”, which means that the 
right or power to control a corporation rests on majority shareholders, a minority 
shareholder is in a disadvantageous position. According to s. 2 (3) of the Canada 
Business Corporation Act (hereinafter CBCA8): 
 a body corporate is controlled by a person or by two or more bodies 
corporate if 
• (a) securities of the body corporate to which are attached more 
than fifty per cent of the votes that may be cast to elect directors of the 
body corporate are held, other than by way of security only, by or for the 
benefit of that person or by or for the benefit of those bodies corporate; 
and 
• (b) the votes attached to those securities are sufficient, if exercised, 
to elect a majority of the directors of the body corporate. 
                                                 




Usually, in light of the small number of shareholders in a closely-held corporation, 
s. 2 (3) (b) is not often applied and, thus, a shareholder who owns 50 percent plus 1 vote, 
or in some cases 66.6 percent plus one vote9, can make any decisions without taking the 
minority’s opinions into consideration10. Because of this rule, it is clear that the majority 
is able to exploit its rights and place the minority in a disadvantageous position. This 
happens because of the nature of the corporation and the purpose of the corporation (this 
question will be analyzed more depth in the next part).  
Usually, people carry out business activities for two essential reasons: “producing 
the maximum benefit from the activity for themselves and reducing the risk arising out of 
the activity”11. In order to reduce risk, which in our case is liability, the government 
provides for different types of companies with limited liability, as developed by all legal 
systems. The prevailing form of corporation in Canada is the closely-held corporation. In 
Germany, it is the Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) that is, the Limited 
Liability Company. In Ukraine, it is the Tovarystvo z Obmezhenoyu Vidpovidalnistyu 
(TOV), also referring to Limited Liability Company. GmbH and TOV are civil law 
equivalents of a closely-held corporation. 
                                                 
9 In the case when a special resolution is required. See for example, CBCA, supra 
note 7, s.2 (1). 
10 It needs to be noted that this statement does not hold true in every situation. For 
example, this is not true in the situation of fundamental changes.  
11 Daniel Szentkuti, Minority shareholder protection rules in Germany, France 
and in the United Kingdom: A comparative overview (LLM Thesis, Central European 




Producing maximum benefit from activity, which is the second essential reason 
for doing business, means that a shareholder expects some remuneration from the 
corporation for the risks which he or she takes. This remuneration can be expressed in the 
forms of salary, bonus, dividend, and so forth. 
Because of the focus on wealth maximization, many problems arise between 
shareholders and director(s). This usually happens when there is a controlling shareholder 
in a corporation. Such a shareholder often supports his or her own interests and 
disregards the interests of the minority. Moreover, he or she may act in his or her own 
interests at the expense of the minority.  
It is important to know that a well-functioning company serves not only the 
interest of the owners, either individually or as a group, but also provides job 
opportunities to employees, provides services to people and pays tax to support the 
national budget12. Shareholder abuse can lead to the dissolution of a corporation, which 
means “losing a functioning economic unit from the national macroeconomic aspect”13. 
Moreover, in light of recent developments, such as the global financial crisis, the public 
is losing faith in banks and is, therefore, investing less money in financial institutions14. It 
                                                 
12 Ibid at 8. 
13 Ibid. 
14 This does not concern Canada and Germany, as much as it concerns Ukraine. 
Because of the crisis, people who had deposits in Ukrainian banks simply could not 
withdraw their deposit (money), because the National Bank of Ukraine issued a 
document which prohibited returning deposits in order to save the banking system. 




is known that the worst situation for an economy is when the public does not spend its 
money and, instead, keeps it in their pockets. Money has to be in a turnover. That is why 
governments are interested in creating rules that work not only for big investors, but also 
for small investors who are usually in the position of minority shareholders. More 
importantly, those rules also protect the different interests within a company and support 
stable corporate operation. 
It is also fair to protect the minority shareholder. Laws should protect all 
shareholders, not only the majority, but also the minority.  This is because all 
shareholders are vested with the same power and rights, whether someone invests one 
dollar or one million dollars, or holds one per cent or 99 percent of the shares. The only 
difference is that their rights are realized differently. Moreover, most people cannot 
invest enough to be in a position of the controlling shareholder of a company. Thus, 
because of the money disparity, a minority shareholder, usually, is not able to compete on 
an equal level with majority shareholders without the assistance of governments and 
courts. In this case, the judiciary and legislation balance power between the minority and 
the majority.   
To sum up, the protection of shareholders is needed to ensure economic growth, 
expand capital markets, increase employment and provide fairness. Investments are 
crucial for a country to function (economical aspect) and since they are crucial to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
disintegration of the USSR all the monies that people had in the USSR Bank were lost 




country, the investors, who, in most cases, are shareholders, should be protected (legal 
aspect and fairness).    
2.2 A Controlling Shareholder: Advantageous or Not? 
Before examining minority shareholder protection, it is important to consider the 
positive and negative aspects of having a controlling shareholder15. This is important for 
three reasons. First, it helps to explain how the majority can abuse the rights of the 
minority. Second, it helps to focus on the bigger problems of the minority, solutions to 
which are essential for them and for a company’s interest. Finally, it helps to show that a 
government should not blindly support the minority over the majority shareholders 
because, in many situations, a controlling shareholder may bring positive contribution to 
a corporation.  
A controlling shareholder can be one person, or it can be represented by a group 
related to each other (family, several companies which are controlled by the same person). 
Having minority and majority shareholders in a privately-owned corporation is a 
common situation in Canada, Ukraine and Germany. 
                                                 
15 Controlling shareholders are those with enough shares under their control to 





In common international practice the existence of a controlling shareholder can, 
and usually does, lead to a lowering in the ranking of a company16. But the controlling 
shareholder can also bring a corporation certain advantages. 
2.2.1 Advantages of Having a Controlling Shareholder 
A “real owner” of the company  
A controlling shareholder presents as a “real owner” of the company. This is an 
advantage for a company because of the possibility of concentrating resources to apply to 
areas prioritized by a controlling shareholder. There is no need to persuade many persons 
regarding strategic decisions. In this situation, a controlling shareholder becomes a de 
facto owner of the company and decides the direction the company will go in. This 
presents key possibilities for the operation of the company. 
 
Correlation between the economic interests of a controlling shareholder and a 
company 
 
If one were to consider a controlling shareholder as an economically rational 
person, it would be right to assume that he or she tends to increase his or her own 
fortune17. Generally, this is not the same as increasing the market value of the company. 
                                                 
16  This mainly concerns a company which wants to initiate an IPO. See, for 
example, the general rules to assess a company by Standard and Poor’s, Rating criteria, 
online: Standard and Poor’s <http://www.standardandpoors.com>.   
17  Hadiye Aslan, Controlling Shareholders and the Agency Cost of Debt: 
Evidence from Syndicated Loans, online: Social Science Research Network 




However, as the shareholder retains control in a corporation, the shareholder can increase 
his or her own fortune from increasing corporate value, which reflects positively also on 
the minority.  
 
Great involvement in management   
It is common that a controlling shareholder would occupy the position of a 
general manager of a corporation. In this case, ownership is combined with management.  
For a company which is in its infancy, this situation is not only common, but also quite 
usual. Until the company obtains sufficient capital, even current or routine bargains may 
lead to catastrophic results. Thus, to deal with these risks, a controlling shareholder takes 
on managerial functions. With capital growth, fatal risks move into the area of strategic 
decisions and strategic investments. This is why it becomes natural for the shareholder to 
leave day-to-day control and to concentrate his or her attention on strategic questions 
through the general meeting. 
Also, a controlling shareholder works with management much more closely than 
other shareholders. This reduces the risk that management would make poorly thought 
and groundless decisions. 
Strengthening control under management and safety of assets 
A controlling shareholder is usually more careful and observant than the 




him of her18. A majority shareholder reacts violently to the threat of losing assets and can 
be very effective in defending a company (though mainly in widely-held corporations 
regarding takeover). 
Possibility of additional investments in company development, and additional 
support for the company at a time of crisis 
 
The World Financial Crisis showed that many shareholders took risks by taking 
loans for themselves in exchange of pledges, and gave the money to the company in order 
to save it. This can mainly be performed by controlling shareholders, because in most 
cases only they are able to find or borrow a substantial amount of money which could 
help a corporation to pay debts and, accordingly, remain operational. 
Public image and reputation
19
 
Information on who is a controlling shareholder and who, per se, is the owner of a 
business, becomes more accessible. This information may attract the attention of the 
public and press, thereby shaping the shareholder’s public image. Human psychology 
may then start working such that the shareholder would desire to gain public success, 
acknowledgement and respect. These factors might motivate a controlling shareholder to 
develop the corporation’s business.  
                                                 
18  Jose Miguel Mendoza, The Controlling Shareholder as Reputational 







The personality of a controlling shareholder, frequently, directly influences a 
company’s reputation. It is known that the reputation of a company is very important for 
its operations and in many cases, plays the biggest role in choosing contractors, 
consumers or customers. Reputation is especially significant for professional firms, such 
as law, accounting, auditing, travel, stock exchanges, underwriters and so on. The 
importance of reputation can be seen in the example of audit firms. Almost all the 
international auditor market is controlled by the “Big Four”20. This is mainly because of 
their reputations, which they developed through many years of high level service to their 
clients. 
Possible interest in expanding the corporation through an IPO
21
  
Initiating an Initial Public Offering allows the majority not only to receive 
additional funds without loss of management, but also to evaluate the market price of a 
corporation and to increase liquidity of shares. Moreover, ownership of a control block of 
shares might be deemed prestigious. A good example is Facebook Inc22. Before 2012, the 
company was privately owned by Mark Zuckerberg and other founders. On May 18th 
2012, the stock market began selling its shares. From a small private company, Facebook 
turned into a large international corporation. By using Facebook as an example, we see 
                                                 
20 The name of the 4 biggest audit firms in the world are PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & Young, KPMG. 
21 Initial Public Offering. 





how controlling shareholders helped to promote the company and eventually helped 
minority shareholders, since the value of the company dramatically increased. 
2.2.2 Negative Aspects of the Existence of a Controlling Shareholder in a 
Company 
A controlling shareholder can bring not only advantages to a company, but also 
risks for other shareholders and the company itself.  The potential risks are: 
Risk of ill-considered decision-making 
Often while trying to achieve more substantial results, a controlling shareholder 
may initiate questionable business projects. Since he or she possesses the controlling 
packet of shares, a majoritarian shareholder, as a rule, can insist on moving forward with 
that kind of a project. This can lead to negative consequences. Generally, excessive 
closeness between the controlling shareholder and management, and the shareholder’s 
involvement in the direction of business, can play both positive and negative roles. A sole 
director, who is appointed by a controlling shareholder, would take the majority’s opinion 
into consideration very carefully, and would usually not propose something else that may 
be better for the company. In this situation, a director of the company is an executor of 
someone’s ideas, but not a creator of such. He or she becomes the top executor rather 
than the top manager, not a leader of the company, but rather a “puppet” in the 




The above-mentioned risk is increasing, especially in situations where the 
controlling shareholder is appointed to the position of an executive director. The 
shareholder might eventually feel like he or she is in possession of unlimited and absolute 
power in a company and, therefore, start thinking that he or she cannot be wrong, an 
attitude that might lead to fatal consequences for the business. 
Egoistical (selfish) interest, disregard of other stakeholders’ interests, and 
attempt to receive additional (subsidiary) income at the expense of other members 
It is not a secret that a human being is selfish by nature. Most of the time he/she 
puts his or her own interests before those of others. This scenario is prevalent in corporate 
relationships.  
This can happen when a majority shareholder ignores the interests of the minority 
and refuses to pay dividends. Meanwhile, for the minority in a closely-held corporation, 
there is no stock market for shares, and dividends are usually their only source of profit. 
The owner, who can always sell stakes easily, because per se, he/she sells the whole 
business23, often prefers not to share the profit with others, but to use it for developing the 
company. At the same time, the shareholder may raise his or her salary and hire his or her 
relatives, friends or trusted persons as his or her counselors, with salaries substantially 
exceeding his or her own. Another widespread method for a shareholder’s self-
enrichment, which is more common in countries like Ukraine and Russia, is to sell the 
                                                 
23 Ronald J Gilson & Jeffrey N Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 




assets of a corporation to another company for an undervalued price24. Usually, the other 
company is also owned or controlled by the majority shareholder. In other words, this 
shareholder may concentrate profits outside the corporation. In those countries, the 
aforementioned scheme works for the director and the controlling shareholder because he 
or she does not owe fiduciary duties and the director is protected because his or her 
decision to sell the assets is usually approved by a majority of the shareholders. 
Desire to strengthen personal control 
Controlling shareholders may desire to strengthen their control in a corporation. 
There are many reasons for this. One is to obtain a special majority25  of votes. In this 
case, the controlling shareholder can make almost any resolution without considering the 
opinion of the minority.26 Another reason, which is important in Ukraine and Russia, is to 
protect a company from seizure by the minority and/or outsiders, also called “raider 
attack” and “greenmailing” and so on. Such a seizure is much easier to accomplish if a 
minority exists within a company. These attacks from the outsider can be completely 
legal, such as when it is done to invalidate contracts by which the controlling shareholder 
obtained majority votes. It is considered somewhat legal (half legal) when an outsider, 
because of his/her connections, incites actions in the form of, for example, inspections by 
                                                 
24 Ibid. See also Simon Johnson et al, “Tunneling” (2000) 90 Am Econ Rev 22. 
25 In this thesis special majority votes means possession of 2/3 or 3/4 of the votes 
or the subscribed capital, which requires passing a special resolution. 




tax officials, the police, prosecutors, sanitary officials and others, during which a 
company is not able to work normally; or when an outsider “helps” to open a criminal 
case regarding the shareholder or his/her relatives. This cynical action is captured in the 
expression: “There is always a fitting law for a fitting person”27. Usually after such 
actions, the controlling shareholder sells his or her shares for a “peanut” in order to stop 
the inspections or to close the criminal case in order to avoid the last possible scenario: 
total criminal seizure of the company. That seizure happens when dozens of men block 
the entrance of a corporation’s premises while showing documents that state that 
yesterday there was a general meeting and/or the CEO made a resolution by which a new 
“lawful” CEO was elected. This “newly-made CEO” takes all the documents and leaves 
the company.  Without the director, stamps and documents, a company simply is not able 
to carry out any transactions or sign any contracts. Then the shareholders try to find the 
“newly-made CEO” and are ready to share stakes with him or her in order to save the 
company. This last scenario resembles a Hollywood movie; however, it happens in this 
day and age in Ukraine and Russia. 
The problems with selling a controlling packet of shares and inheritance of the 
business 
While making a decision to purchase stakes in a company, an investor takes into 
consideration the risks connected to the possible presence of a controlling shareholder. 
However, the majority shareholder has the right to sell his or her stakes at any time, and 
                                                 




usually he or she cannot be restricted by articles of association of the company. 
Furthermore, the controlling shareholder can sell his/her shares at a premium a value 
compared to what non-controlling shares may sell for28. “The existence of an ongoing 
stream of private benefits increases the value of the controlling shares compared to the 
non-controlling shares by the present value of the future private benefits”.29 
It is not different for a minority shareholder who will become a new controlling 
shareholder of a company, and what purposes he/she is pursuing. This shareholder may 
be an outsider who may wish to sell the company for the reason of the interests of the 
new owner. The purchaser can possibly be a competing company or a consumer company 
interested in lowering the prices of produced goods, a move that can lead to risks of 
losing profit. Moreover, there are many other possible negative scenarios associated with 
purchasing a control block of stakes from an outsider. 
The inheritance of a business by heirs due to the death of the controlling 
shareholder can bring similar risks. The heirs may not have enough experience and 
knowledge to run the company. They may have disagreements among themselves and 
this can allow an outsider or minority to seize control of the company. They may also 
want to sell the company. There are other risks and problems, which may lead to negative 
consequences for a minority and for a company.  
                                                 





Generally, a company in which the controlling shareholder is also the CEO is very 
vulnerable because losing the controlling shareholder also leads to losing the main 
manager. In that case the company has to solve two problems simultaneously: ownership 
and managerial succession. If a company does not have a board of directors (as a rule, the 
shareholder in control is not obligated to form a board of directors and usually does not 
deem it necessary), it automatically loses all control bodies. In this situation, it is very 
likely that the company will be dissolved.  
The aforementioned disadvantages result in risks for minority shareholders, 
potential investors and other stakeholders. As can be seen, the majority in a company can 
bring not only additional opportunities, but additional risks as well. Thus, a controlling 
shareholder has to realize that he or she is responsible not only for his or herself, but also 
for the minority shareholders, other stakeholders and the company itself. Therefore, it is 
important to know how a minority is able to protect itself and the company. 
2.3 Shareholder Primacy Debate 
2.3.1 General Information 
The previous part, on the relationship between shareholders, showed that along 
with advantages, the majority shareholder can abuse the rights of a minority. A director 
also can be another source of oppression for a minority. Thus, before analyzing minority 
shareholders’ protection, it is necessary to focus on role of a corporation and its best 
interest. This issue is important, as different approaches say that a director’s duties differ 




interest of a corporation. Furthermore, interpretation of the concept of “the best interest 
of the corporation” gives rise to the practical problem as to what the directors’ duties are 
and how they have to carry them out. In other words, directors’ duties may substantially 
vary depending on whether preference is given to one conception over another in how 
those duties are viewed. 
In the early 1930s, there was a lively debate “between two preeminent corporate 
scholars”30 on the question of the purpose of a corporation. This debate is so important 
and complicated that even after almost a century, there has not emerged a sole approach 
to solving the issue the debate is about. “The beating heart of the [debate] is the question 
of what it means to act ‘in the best interest of corporation’.”31 
On one side, there was Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means (hereinafter Berle and 
Means or Berle) who wrote the book “The Modern Corporation and Private Property.”32 
They support the position now called “shareholder primacy”, according to which a 
corporation exists only for the shareholders’ wealth maximization, in other words, to 
make money for its shareholders. Berle argued that: 
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[A]ll powers granted to a corporation or to the management of a 
corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether derived from 
statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only 
for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears.33  
Thus, Berle asserted that there is only one kind of beneficiary of a company – 
shareholders. As such, management must act in a way to maximize shareholders’ profit.  
On the other side of the debate stood professor Merrick Dodd (hereinafter Dodd) 
of Harvard.  Dodd disagreed with Berle’s position regarding shareholder primacy and 
supported the view of a business corporation “as an economic institution which has a 
social service as well as a profit-making function” 34 . He thought that management 
“should be concerned with the interests of employees, consumers and the general public, 
as well as of the stockholders.”35  
The following discusses these two position in detail. 
2.3.2 Berle and Means on Shareholder Primacy 
In their book The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle and Means 
argued that a corporation is a means by which to earn money for shareholders. Berle 
demonstrated in great detail how separation of ownership and control “was increasingly 
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characteristic of the large, powerful business corporations in which the broad dispersion 
of share ownership necessitated delegation of responsibility for control to a small group 
of professional managers”.36  This separation resulted in a new employee class – the 
managerial elite or “princes”37 - with a variety of interests, which, inevitably, lead to a 
conflict of interests. Shareholders seek corporate profit maximization for their own 
benefit, and managers seek to entrench themselves in order to use their power and 
facilities to suit their own interests38.  In their book, Berle and Means point out as follows: 
[I]t is … evident that we are dealing not only with distinct, but often 
opposing groups, ownership on the one side, control on the other - a  
control which tends to move further and further away from ownership and 
ultimately to lie in the hands of the management  itself, a management  
capable of perpetuating its own position. The concentration of economic 
power separate from ownership has, in fact, created economic empires, 
and has delivered these empires into the hands of a new form of 
absolutism, relegating "owners" to the position of those who supply the 
means whereby the new princes may exercise their power.39 
 Berle and Means therefore support the position whereby corporate law would 
offer greater protection to shareholders, paying attention mainly to problems that may 
arise between shareholders and directors. The authors emphasized that managers, because 
of their power, can easily abuse the rights of shareholders and, thus, shareholders should 
be protected. Berle did not pay much attention to the relationship between shareholders 
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because, in his opinion, they have the same interest – to increase their profit. That is why, 
in his view, the biggest probable threat to shareholders is management. The problem is 
that managers, as human beings, desire to maximize their own welfare40, contrary to the 
interests of shareholders. Berle pointed out: “it must be conceded, at present, that the 
relatively unbridled scope of corporate management has, to date, brought forward in the 
main seizure of power without recognition of responsibility – ambition without 
courage.”41 He emphasized that the danger was that “[w]hen the fiduciary obligation of 
corporate management and ‘control’ to stockholders is weakened or eliminated, 
management and ‘control’ become for all practical purposes absolute.”42  Managerial 
control on issuing shares, by which they can dilute the stock influence of shareholders43, 
having a broad discretion over whether to distribute earnings to shareholders, and 
deciding whether to sell or not to sell assets of a corporation, only lends a sense of 
urgency to Berle and Means’s analysis.44 In light of the aforementioned problems, and as 
a supporter of the private property model of corporate ownership, Berle added: “It 
requires little analysis to make plain the fact that property, as understood in the capitalist 
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system, is rapidly losing its original characteristics. Unless the law stops the wide open 
gap 45  which the corporate mechanism has introduced, the entire system has to be 
revaluated”46.  Thus, Berle’s main concern was the question how shareholders could be 
assured that management would act to maximize their profit. 
 In terms of solution Berle saw the role of management as that of a shareholder 
trustee. The main principle of trust is to protect the interests of the beneficiary. Thus, a 
director, as a trustee, should act in a way to protect the interests of the beneficiary (the 
shareholders).  Furthermore, a court has to protect the interests of the shareholder because 
corporate statutes define the director’s power very broadly and vaguely and, in many 
cases, give an extremely wide leeway. “For Berle and Means, use of the trust and 
property analogy led necessarily to the conclusion that the trustee must act for the benefit 
of the equitable owner or cestui que trust – the shareholder.”47 Thus, any actions of 
management regarding spending corporate assets, charity or other activities which are not 
financially beneficial to shareholders are not allowed, or can be allowed only after the 
shareholders’ approval.   
 It is worth mentioning that Berle did not deny that management, as a 
representative of a corporation, which is a social institution, does render a social service. 
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However, in contrast to Dodd, he supported the position that when shareholders, as part 
of society, receive profits, they extend the welfare of the general public and by this, 
satisfy a social need. It is important to recognize that shareholders will spend money on, 
for example, extending businesses and building houses, leading to increasing job 
opportunities. Eventually, this reflects positively on society. The public may say a lot of 
negative things about businessmen; however, it is necessary to remember that they play 
an extremely significant role in social structure development because many of them 
enable society to carry on numerous beneficial activities. 
Berle’s shareholder primacy position, which is mostly based on “private property” 
rights and aggregate theory, and using the institution of trust, was not entirely new. The 




The Ford Motor Company had accumulated a capital surplus of $60 million. The 
price of the Model T, Ford's mainstay product, had been successively cut over the years 
while the wages of the workers had dramatically increased. The company's president and 
majority stockholder, Henry Ford, resisted the distribution of a surplus because he 
planned to make massive investments in new plants that would enable Ford to 
dramatically increase production and the number of people employed at the plants, while 
continuing to cut the costs and prices of his cars. Henry Ford asserted that his ambition 
“is to employ still more men, to spread the benefits of this industrial system to the 
                                                 




greatest possible number, to help them build up their lives and their homes. To do this we 
are putting the greatest share of our profits back in the business." 49  The minority 
shareholders, two brothers, John Dodge and Horace Dodge, who owned 10% of the 
company and were the largest shareholders next to Ford, objected to his strategy, and 
sought to declare dividends. 
The Michigan Supreme Court’s response said that management should first of all 
be responsible to shareholders: 
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit 
of the stockholders. The powers of the director are to be employed for that 
end. The discretion is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that 
end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to reduction of 
profit, or to the non-distribution of profits among stockholders in order to 
devote them to other purposes.50 
 
The shareholder primacy concept, as reflected in the opinion of the court quoted 
above, rejects any notion of using management’s power to engage in socially responsive 
activities51. Instead, as Berle and Means argued, management’s responsibility is to the 
shareholder. David Millon correctly asserts that as “trustees, managers must act only in 
the way that furthers shareholder financial interest, because to countenance anything else 
would be to allow conduct no different from outright embezzlement of shareholder 
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property by the trustee.”52 In other words, it is clear that corporate activity is nothing 
more than the “pursuit of business objectives by individual property owners acting 
through fiduciaries.”53 
Since the Ford case and the articulation of the view of Berle and Means, the 
shareholder primacy concept has become the fundamental principle of corporate law, as 
well as the main “guide” for managers, and the best response to corporate social 
responsibility arguments. Thus, if managers want to act in a manner contrary to 
shareholders’ financial interests, they must: 
- receive express authorization under the articles or bylaws;  
- receive express authorization from shareholders as per resolution; 
- argue that, in fact, shareholders will benefit (even if only in the long run) 
from this conduct.  
 
Regarding the question of whether it is permissible to engage in charity, the court 
in Hutton v. West Cork Ry. emphasized that “the law does not say that there are to be no 
cakes and ale, but, there are to be cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit 
of the company.”54   
As previously mentioned, Berle did not deny corporate social responsibility. He 
argued that enrichment of shareholders helps to enrich society itself, because 
                                                 
52 Ibid at 223. 
53 Ibid at 224. 




shareholders are part of society. At the end of the dialogue between Berle and Dodd, 
Berle wrote: 
Twenty years ago, the writer had controversy with the late Professor E. 
Merrick Dodd, of Harvard Law School, the writer holding that corporate 
powers were power in trust for shareholders while Professor Dodd argued 
that these powers were in trust for the entire community. The argument 
has been settled (at least for the time being) squarely in favor of Professor 
Dodd’s contention.55  
 
However, as Joseph Weiner points out, this does not mean that Berle accepted 
Dodd’s theory, but rather he agreed that social facts and judicial decisions supported that 
view.56 
 
2.3.3 Dodd's Position: Support for Corporate Social Responsibility 
Professor Dodd of Harvard Law School held a view different from that of Berle 
and Means. Dodd was sure that in the wake of the Great Depression, it became clear that 
business apparent disregarded public welfare.  While ‘natural entity theory’ was being 
used to free the corporation from government-imposed restrictions on its ability to 
accumulate wealth, and, as well, to imply that corporate persons owed no obligations or 
responsibilities different from those owed by natural persons, Dodd, in his famous article 
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of 1932 57  demonstrated how the natural entity idea could provide and support a 
theoretical basis for corporate social responsibility.58 
According to his point of view, a manager should concern his or herself with the 
interest of employees, consumers and the general public, as well as stockholders. The 
biggest problem Dodd was faced with, was how to justify a corporate policy that is 
beneficial not only for shareholders, because some acts which are advantageous to 
employees, customers and the public may potentially put shareholders in a 
disadvantageous position. 
His solution was based on the entity theory. He argued that if management’s role 
is to act as a shareholder’s agent, failure to promote shareholder interests over others 
(employees, for example) would violate managers’ fiduciary responsibilities. If, however, 
management were the agent of a corporation itself, distinct from shareholders, and that 
entity was obligated to be a “good citizen”, then management, acting for the benefit of a 
corporation, would “enjoy the power to discharge the corporation’s citizenship 
responsibilities, even in a situation in which the shareholders might object.”59 In other 
words, Dodd supported the position according to which managers are trustees for the 
corporation, not for its shareholders. 
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His position was based on the core element of the entity theory – the idea that a 
corporation is a separate entity from shareholders. This position can be found in many 
cases, one of which is the famous Salomon v Salomon60. Accordingly, if a corporation is 
a separate entity and management works for a corporation, but not for shareholders, then 
management’s first obligation would be to act in the best interest of the corporation, and 
only then, in the best interest of shareholders. Thus, in Dodd’s opinion, he disproved the 
shareholder primacy position, which was based mainly on the aggregate theory and, 
consequently, on the trust relationship between management and shareholders. 
Theoretically, putting shareholders in the background is somehow grounded, but what 
about employees, customers and the general public?  
Dodd’s support for stakeholders other than shareholders was based on the 
declaration of Owen Young, the President of General Electric Co: 
If there is one thing a lawyer 61  is taught it is knowledge of 
trusteeship and the sacredness of that position. Very soon he saw rising a 
notion that managers were no longer attorneys for stockholders; they were 
becoming trustees of an institution. 
If you will pardon me for being personal, it makes a great 
difference in my attitude toward my job as an executive officer of the 
General Electric Company whether I am a trustee of the institution or an 
attorney for the investor. If I am a trustee, who are the beneficiaries of the 
trust? To whom do I owe my obligations? 
My conception of it is this: That there are three groups of people 
who have an interest in that institution. One is the group of fifty-odd 
thousand people who have put their capital in the company, namely, its 
stockholders. Another is a group of well toward one hundred thousand 
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people who are putting their labor and their lives into the business of the 
company. The third group is of customers and the general public. 
Customers have a right to demand that a concern so large shall not 
only do its business honestly and properly, but, further, that it shall meet 
its public obligations and perform its public duties — in a word, vast as it 
is, that it should be a good citizen. 
Now, I conceive my trust first to be to see to it that the capital 
which is put into this concern is safe, honestly and wisely used, and paid a 
fair rate of return. Otherwise we cannot get capital. The worker will have 
no tools. 
Second, that the people who put their labor and lives into this 
concern get fair wages, continuity of employment, and a recognition of 
their right to their jobs where they have educated themselves to highly 
skilled and specialized work. 
Third, that the customers get a product which is as represented and 
that the price is such as is consistent with the obligations to the people 
who put their capital and labor in. 
Last, that the public has a concern functioning in the public interest 
and performing its duties as a great and good citizen should. 
I think what is right in business is influenced very largely by the 
growing sense of trusteeship which I have described. One no longer feels 
the obligation to take from labor for the benefit of capital, nor to take from 
the public for the benefit of both, but rather to administer wisely and fairly 
in the interest of all.62 
 
In contrast to Berle, who did not trust management and, therefore, supported the 
position according to which management’s power should be restricted since it can be 
used for abusing shareholders’ rights, Dodd asserted that managers should be given more 
rights. Dodd praised Young as an example of a “real” CEO, arguing that “the only way to 
defend capitalism is through leadership which accepts social responsibility and meets the 
sound needs of the great majority of our people. Such leadership will seek to form 
constructive plans framed not in the interest of capital or capitalism but in the interest of 
                                                 




American people as a whole”63. However, eventually, Dodd changed his opinion about 
management and in his next paper,64 started paying more attention to shareholders: “a 
situation in which the shareholder has to depend rather on the conscience of the 
management than on his own legal rights is a dangerous one”65. But, he still trusted 
management, and believed that they are driven by the desire for prestige rather than by 
pecuniary interests66. 
According to the corporate social responsibility theory, the power of directors is 
limited by the natural entity theory. In this sense, the ultra vires doctrine first of all 
protects the public’s interest by preventing corporate usurpations of power not 
specifically delegated67. This doctrine also serves shareholders to protect their interests 
against the use of corporate resources in unexpected and unauthorized ways. However, it 
had become possible to use charters with wording that gave much power to directors. 
Thus, they could exercise their power “for any lawful business purpose or purposes”, or 
“to promote or conduct any legitimate objects or purposes”. As well, managers could “do 
any and all acts, and exercise any and all powers which a natural person may do or 
exercise, except such as are prohibited by law to corporations.” As can be seen, this 
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wording vested a director with almost unlimited rights and made the ultra vires doctrine 
almost useless. However, the ultra vires doctrine has been used as grounds to invalidate 
some activities. For example, in Brinson Ry v. Exchange Bank 68 , a donation was 
adjudged as an action which was beyond the power of the President of the railway 
company to do. 
With the foregoing summary of the two important positions on who management 
owes its duties to, the next part gives the author’s position regarding shareholder primacy 
and corporate social responsibility, and shows both the positive and negative aspects of 
these concepts. 
 
2.3.4 An Argument for Shareholder Primacy over Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Berle’s shareholder primacy concept and Dodd’s corporate responsibility theory 
are both well-grounded and, most important, are broadly used in many countries by 
academics, practitioners and judges to justify one or the other view of the corporation. 
But up to now, there is no concrete approach that presents a solution to the debate 
reflected in the Berle-Dodd controversy. 
From a theoretical point of view, neither of these theories can be supported in full. 
Berle’s shareholder primacy theory is mainly based on the property model and aggregate 
                                                 




theory, which is hard to justify because in the author’s view, the most common theory 
now is the entity model. Shareholders, de jure, do not own a corporation. A corporation is 
a separate entity, and it is not an aggregation of money and labor. Thus, a manager is not 
a shareholder’s trustee, but rather a corporation’s trustee. However, it does mean that this 
theory should be dismissed. On the contrary, the shareholder primacy position must be 
supported over the corporate social responsibility view. 
Indeed, Dodd’s corporate responsibility theory cannot fully justify corporate 
social responsibility by giving almost unlimited power to directors. His idea is mainly 
based on the entity theory, according to which a corporation is a separate entity, with its 
own rights and obligations. A director is a representative of a corporation and thus, first 
of all, has to fulfill his or her duty to the corporation, but not to the shareholders. 
According to this approach, it can be justified that a director should act in the best interest 
of a corporation. But why the director should not act in the best interest of employees, 
consumers and the general public is hard to justify. 
Indirectly, corporate responsibility theory can be understood to satisfy the interest 
of the public. If a corporation makes profit, it has to pay taxes, which is in the best 
interest of the state and, thus, in the best interest of the public. But this position can also 
be accommodated by the shareholder primacy approach. 
In support of his position, Dodd used the declaration of the President of General 
Electric Co., Owen Young. Though a respected person, arguments to support a theory 
cannot be based on the declarations of a public person, more so the chief executive of a 




General Electric. Each person likes it when someone announces that the interest of each 
person is the foremost task and purpose of a corporation. In 99 per cent of cases, such 
words are “sweet” declarations. Owen Young announced that a director should 
“administer wisely and fairly in the interests of all”69. It is not a secret that responsibility 
towards all means no responsibility at all. As the famous quote puts it: “You like every 
one; that is to say, you are indifferent to everyone”70.  
We live in an imperfect world. Directors of corporations are human; thus, they are 
imperfect agents. They worry not only about the interests of the firms to which they owe 
fiduciary duties, but also about their own interests. “As a result, they may sometimes 
allow self-interest to prevail over duty, and shrink or even steal from the firm”71. This 
problem is called “agency cost” and it is a good example of shareholder primacy. Agency 
costs can only be reduced when someone supervises or controls a director. However, to 
supervise someone or something, there should be some criteria. According to the Dodd 
approach, there is no defining measure. Regarding this position, Professor Lynn Stout 
argues: 
If we ask directors to consider the interests of all the firm’s constituents, 
we are asking them to maximize the joint welfare function of happy 
consumers, secure employees, self-actualized managers and wealthier 
shareholders. How are we to tell when they are doing a good job? 
Although it may be simply enough, at least in theory, to determine how 
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directors’ decision affect the market price of firm’s stock and even some 
of its bonds, measuring the value of employee security, manager self-
actualization, and consumer satisfaction (to give only a few examples) is 
far more difficult. In contrast, it is easy to measure stock price. As a result, 
a shareholder primacy rule leaves directors with far less leeway to claim 
that they are doing a good job for the firm when, in fact, they are doing 
well mostly for themselves. 
 
Professor Mark Roe of Harvard University also supports the position that 
shareholder wealth maximization is the best rule for corporate governance, because “a 
stakeholder measure of managerial accountability could leave managers so much 
discretion that they could easily pursue their own agenda, one that might maximize 
neither shareholder, employee, consumer, nor national wealth, but only their own”72. As 
can be seen, increasing director discretion and the number of beneficiaries can lead to 
negative consequences for all of them. 
If a theory cannot be supported by some positions, the second means for a lawyer 
should be logic. Employing a logical approach in this thesis starts with analyzing Berle’s 
theory first. Why should a director take into account shareholders? First of all, they create 
the company. Secondly, they invest money in the company. Thirdly, they create 
workplaces and hire director(s). They are liable for the company. If a company has 
problems, shareholders, not directors, employees, consumers and general public are 
responsible and directly lose money. It is very rare, if at all, that consumers or the 
government, in order to save a private company, had given money for free (meaning not 
in exchange for shares, bonds, as a loan or as a tax exemption) to a corporation which 
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needs financial support. No one wants to give money without receiving something in 
exchange. Therefore, shareholders who transfer their own money to a company must not 
be expected to take care of consumers and the general public who, in turn, do not care 
about the shareholders. One can argue that a government takes care of shareholders by 
enacting statutes which protect them and give them rights. However, there is a good 
argument to say that this is not true. In the author’s view, the government is mainly 
thinking about itself. It supports its own interests because business pays taxes, which is 
essential for the state. Thus, this situation is an example of mutual benefit. Hypothetically, 
mutual benefit can be present among all stakeholders. For example, when a company 
works well and makes profit, this goes to shareholders as dividends. For a company it is a 
benefit in the form of increased productivity and expansion, for instance, through buying 
new machines, building factories or increasing its reputation. For employees the benefit is 
in the form of salary increases and bonuses. For consumers, it is in the form of the 
company’s reputation, and for the public, it is beneficial because all constituencies are 
“happy” and the company pays taxes. However, this scenario of benefit is a myth and it 
cannot be achieved because each person wants more and more benefit all the time. 
According to the shareholder primacy theory from a logical point of view, a 
corporation can be beneficial to many constituencies. First of all, employees are a means 
of income for shareholders. Thus, a shareholder is concerned about employees and is 
interested in creating the appropriate conditions for work. But again, a shareholder does it 
not because he or she is generous or a good person, but rather because he or she wants to 




that in capitalism, a shareholder may very well see an employee as a machine and nothing 
more. 
The same situation applies to consumers. A shareholder is concerned about 
consumers only because they buy the company’s products and, thus, enrich shareholders. 
Employees are machines that produce goods, and consumers consume them. Both of 
them eventually enrich shareholders and only for this reason, shareholders take care of 
them. 
As to the general public, if a company works well, it creates jobs, workplaces and 
products, which are all important to the public. Most importantly, the company pays taxes, 
which is a form of “government salary.” 
In essence, this is how the system of capitalism works. In this system, most 
people do not really care about others, and everyone is mostly thinking about money and 
themselves. However, this system works because of mutual interest and because it 
satisfies the needs of majority people. 
The foregoing structure would support the view that in a shareholder-employee- 
consumer-public “food chain”, the most important element is the shareholder. By analogy, 
the shareholder is a “sun” and employees, consumers and the public are merely planets 
that revolve around it. If a shareholder does not invest money in a company, all three will 
suffer. The general public or the state, which Dodd mostly supported, is, in this case, not 
a compulsory element. This is the only element without which the chain can still work. 
In accordance with Berle’s theory, directors should be responsible to shareholders 




company is the company’s purpose, and consequently the directors’ main obligation. Any 
actions which can reduce the profits of shareholders or the value of a company are 
intolerable. 
The shareholder primacy concept also fits economic theory and is supported by it.  
“Market systems do both generate winners and losers.” 73  According to the Pareto 
efficiency theory, any actions, changes or transactions are efficient if at least one person 
is better off and no one is worse off74. In our case, if a company pays salary to employees, 
even if it is minimum wage, pays taxes, and also distributes dividends, the incorporation 
of a company is, an efficient action. In general, an efficient action will increase the 
wealth of society75, which is the main aim and principle of economics. This principle 
does not constantly work in Dodd’s approach. For example, according to his position, it 
is impossible to justify lottery or casino activities. If a director shall act in the interests of 
consumers it means that if a consumer loses money in a lottery (which is extremely 
likely), a director is not carrying out of his/her duties in an appropriate way.     
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74 Richard A Posner, “The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in 
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Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: 
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According to Dodd’s model, a corporation is an economic institution which has 
social service as well as profit-making functions. Socially, it seeks to balance the interests 
of the employees, consumers, the general public and shareholders. In his view, a director 
should act in the best interests of all the constituencies of a corporation and the general 
public. Apple Inc., the most valuable (by market value) corporation in 2011, can serve as 
an example. In 2011, Apple’s net profit was 25,922 billion dollars, and the corporation 
employed more than 60,000 people. This is a big corporation with many employees, 
consumers, and shareholders and it is very influential in the world. According to the 
shareholder primacy concept, Apple’s directors have to carry out one of the following 
three actions76: 
- declare all profits as dividends for shareholders; 
- not declare dividends and, instead, keep this money in the company 
account or spend it on development; 
- declare dividends and keep some money in the company account, or spend 
it on development. 
Generally, this is the full list of directors’ actions according to Berle’s approach 
regarding the distribution of profits. On the contrary, according to Dodd’s theory, 
Apple’s directors have to fulfill one of the following actions: 
- declare all profits as dividends for shareholders; 
                                                 




- not declare dividends and, instead, keep the money in the company 
account, or spend it on development; 
- declare dividends and keep some money in the company account, or spend 
it on development; 
- spend all or part of the profit on employee salary or bonuses; 
- hire more employees;  
- spend all or part of the profit as donations to the “public77” ; 
- spend all or part of the profit as gift to consumers78; 
- take any combination of the aforementioned actions. 
Clearly, Dodd’s directors have much more leeway that Berle’s. They have more 
rights, and more possibilities and temptations to abuse them, but Dodd’s directors have to 
act in everyone’s best interest. From a logical point view, “in everyone’s best interest” 
means that everyone’s interest should be “equally” taken into account. This is because if 
someone receives more than the other, it means that a director is not acting in the best 
interest of someone who received less. Therefore, Apple’s directors have to divide all the 
profit into 4 or 379 parts. They must give one part to the shareholders. If this happens, on 
the same day, the shareholders will try to sell shares and reinvest in other countries (if the 
same policy works in the whole country). They must give another part to employees in 
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the form of bonuses or salaries. Employees will be very happy and will “pray” for the 
company’s welfare. Then, they must give another part to consumers, or minimize product 
prices and increase product quality. Eventually, the fourth part would go to the 
government. As can been seen, under ideal conditions, shareholders are treated unequally. 
They bear the biggest risks, but at the end receive the same interest as others, who do not 
risk anything at all or risk less than the shareholders. Thus, we can see that under ideal 
conditions, shareholders are unsatisfied. But if one constituency is not satisfied, and 
everyone is part of society, it can be said that society itself is unsatisfied. Thus, logically, 
Dodd’s approach is senseless. A manager cannot act in the best interest of all 
constituencies in a company. 
Reverting to Apple Inc, it can be asserted that because it is one of the most 
influential companies in the world, it should be socially responsible. This would be 
Dodd’s view. In 2011, the company faced a large scandal. Its employees in China earned 
almost nothing, compared to its employees in other countries. An Apple employee in 
China earned 4 times less than an Apple employee in Korea80. Moreover, employees in 
China repeatedly filed complaints about miserable working conditions in Apple factories. 
In this case the directors did not act in the best interests of the employees. But the 
government could do nothing because Apple is an important company for society and 
country.  As well, the directors can at any time declare that they paid the employees 
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minimum wages and, therefore, they were not in breach of the law. The situation with 
government was not any better. Apple Inc.’s effective federal income tax rate in the US 
was less than 10 percent (instead of 35), “depriving U.S. government coffers of an 
estimated $2 billion+ and the State of California a hefty amount as well”.81  Again, 
Apple’s directors did not act in the best interest of the general public, but again, there was 
no punishment. This can be understood from a legal point of view. They used many 
jurisdictions to optimize taxation, which is completely legal. However, if one only uses 
the “letter of the law”, one cannot find any instruction according to which a director has 
to act in the best interests of the general public and consumers. They do not have any 
direct relationship with the corporation. 
In general, the corporate social responsibility approach looks more like a “sweet 
utopia” or a “desire” (because it is impossible to act in everyone’s best interest in a 
capitalistic world) rather than reality. But this theory is a good instrument to support 
some unpopular action that is detrimental to shareholders. It can also serve to protect 
directors from responsibility, or to balance shareholder primacy against director 
discretion. Written during the Great Depression, this theory was mainly indented to 
overcome that crisis. For the crisis time, some restrictions, a limitation of rights, and the 
distribution of welfare from some people, in order to support others, are permissible. 
However, it is necessary to point out the fact that it is permissible not because of 
corporate law, but rather because of the extraordinary nature of the situation. Dodd was 
                                                 




sure that management would become civil servants and would manage in a good way to 
gain prestige: 
Such service has in most civilized communities, from the age of Pericles 
to the age of Mussolini and Stalin, conferred upon the higher ranks of 
public servants power and prestige unequalled by that given to any other 
class in the community […] If, as has not infrequently been the case in the 
history of western civilization, man have been educated to regard power 
and prestige of public office as more important than material riches.82 
   
Nowadays it is quite rare to meet an honest person. Very often today, prestige is 
measured in terms of money. Today, we use the word “prestige” as an indicator of 
financial success. Someone might have a prestigious car, live in prestigious area, or work 
at a prestigious (well-paying) job, which again are all measured in terms of money. 
Nowadays, almost no one can say that teaching in a school (not in a university) is a 
prestigious job. Some time ago, however, it was extremely prestigious to be a teacher in a 
school. Again, today, people trust each other less. Some time ago, the words of an 
honorable person would be put in evidence in a court. Now, this is not the case. This is 
not to say that the past was better than the present; rather, it is to emphasize that a lot of 
things have changed, especially attitudes towards the system of values. Thus, to assert 
that a manager will perform his duties in a fair way because of prestige has little 
relevance today, if any at all. 
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When someone takes into account first the interests of society and then his or her 
own interest, this can lead to extremely negative consequences 83. Some of the people that 
Dodd used as examples of the “right” managers84  who would protect the rights and 
interests of employees, customers, the general public and shareholders discredited 
themselves and cannot be believed or given unlimited power today. 
As earlier argued, in general, Dodd’s approach seems impractical. It comes across 
more like a slogan or ideology than a theory based on law and doctrine. However, it can 
be used beneficially in some cases and, furthermore, can be used appropriately. Today, 
many corporations are more than just corporations, but not from a corporate law point of 
view. These include oil companies which build new cities where the only jobs are 
provided by them; banks, which have trillions of dollars worth of assets; investment trusts, 
which manage substantial funds; and television broadcasting companies, which spread 
news to billions of people. All of these companies should not be controlled in the same 
way as other corporations (again, not because of corporate law, but because of their 
significance). A private bank is not just a private corporation; it is part of the country’s 
banking system and, indeed, the whole monetary system depends on the banks. Losing a 
bank could lead to a chain reaction that could eventually destroy the monetary system to 
everyone’s detriment. Managers of a bank have to act not only in the interests of 
shareholders, but also predict risks that the general public may face.  The same situation 
would prevail if a corporation is a monopoly. A monopolistic company cannot regulate 
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prices by itself, and use an “open pricing mechanism”, which other companies can do. 
But, these big and influential companies are the exceptions rather than the general rule. 
Many who advocate increasing directors’ rights and powers support their position 
by giving examples that center on “anti-takeover” statutes and several key decisions, such 
as Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co.85, Revlon, Inc v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holding Inc.
86
, BCE v 1976 Debentureholders
87
. Those who do not advocate this position 
base their examples on “not-anti-takeover statutes”88  and related cases which openly 
express the position that directors have to act in the best interest of shareholders89. 
It is not a secret that takeover is not the whole of corporate law; this is only a 
small part of it. Moreover, in closely-held corporations, takeovers are almost nothing. 
This confirms the position according to which a director’s power in a “takeover” action is 
unusual, more like an exception than the main rule. “Anti-takeover” statutes are 
questionable and are criticized as ineffective or counterproductive for the advancement of 
non-shareholder interests.  As Ruth Kuras systemizes: 
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First, the permissive nature of the permissive statutes means that the 
consideration of stakeholder interests is discretionary. Consequently 
directors can easily ignore their interests. Second, these statutes are not 
enforceable. There is no remedy for a failure to consider stakeholder 
interests. Third, the term "stakeholder" is not clearly defined. General 
terms such as "customers" or "community" are ambiguous and there is no 
guidance to define them. Fourth, these statutes may be abused by boards 
seeking to entrench themselves. Directors may hide behind vague duties to 
conflicting groups to serve their own interests; too much discretion is 
conferred without assigning any corresponding responsibility. Almost any 
corporate action can be justified as in the interest of some constituency. 
Fifth, the legislation does not explain why directors should have 
responsibilities to various constituencies, nor does it provide standards for 
assigning relative weights to the constituents.90 
 
It is hard not to agree with these observations. In fact, though the idea of 
corporate social responsibility makes sense, it does not belong within corporate law. 
Some common place examples would illustrate this point: normally, no one would want 
his or her money in his or her own private bank account to be used for someone else. As 
well, no one would want another to come to their home and start living in it without 
permission, simply because he or she does not have a place to live. Similarly, no one 
would want to be called by the director of his or her company to be told that the director 
gave the company’s machines to the government but hired hundreds of employees. All of 
this would start with the declaration of social responsibility, which would be followed by 
the cancellation of private property because private property causes a stratification of 
people and does not satisfy everyone’s needs equally. 
                                                 
90  Ruth Kuras, “Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canada-US Comparative 




Those who support the corporate social responsibility policy depart from the 
essence and substance of corporate law. This goes back to the days when the Roman 
Empire jurist Ulpian divided law into public and private. Back then many lawyers, 
mainly from civil law countries, developed this division.91 
 In short, the difference between public and private law designates whose interest 
the law serves, and who initiates the protection of those interests. For example, criminal 
law is a public law because it serves the interests of the state. Indeed, it is government 
that starts the process of prosecution when someone breaches a rule of criminal law. 
There is no legal equality of parties and leeway in public law. If someone commits a 
crime, a police officer must open a criminal case. If a court awards a fine in a criminal 
case, it must be paid not to the victim, but to the government. Civil law, on the contrary, 
is private law. All parties are equal. If one wants to sign a contract with an organization, 
one can choose to sign it or not sign it. No one, as a general rule, can compel anyone to 
sign a contact or to sell assets in civil law against their free will. If someone breaches a 
contract, the other party, not the government, decides whether to start a lawsuit or not. In 
civil court, parties have equal rights. Finally, if a court awards a fine in civil case, it must 
be paid to the injured party, but not the government.   
Thus, supporters of corporate social responsibility deviate from the tenets of 
private property and, in the author’s view, forget that corporate law is private law. 
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Corporate law has to serve private interests, not public interests. Businessmen have one 
main interest, to make money. Corporate law regulates the formation and functioning of 
corporations. Functioning, in this case, is the system of rules that regulate relationships 
within a corporation and with other contracting parties. A company is created with the 
objective to make profit, if other objectives are not specified in the articles of association. 
Their objectives are different from those of charities, schools, universities and so forth. A 
company consists of shareholders and employees92. Thus, the relationships which can 
possibly arise in a company are those between the corporation and a shareholder; 
between a shareholder and another shareholder; between the corporation and an 
employee; and between an employee and another employee. It is also possible for there to 
be a relationship between a director and a company, if the director is not an employee. A 
relationship between an employee and an employee, and a relationship between a 
corporation and an employee, are both regulated, mainly, by labor law. Therefore, there 
remain only the corporation-shareholder, shareholder-shareholder and director-
corporation relationships. A director is a corporation’s agent or representative. Thus, we 
have the following relationships: director-shareholder, shareholder-shareholder, director-
corporation. We cannot substitute the last relationship because articles of associations 
specify the relationship between a director and a corporation. We can, however, 
substitute a director-corporation relationship with a director-shareholder relationship 
because shareholders define a director’s rights and obligations in the articles. Thus, we 
come to the conclusion that internal corporate relationships, that is, relationships within 
                                                 




the corporation, are relationships between a corporation and the shareholder, a 
shareholder and another shareholder, and, with much difficulty, between a corporation 
and a director. This internal relationship and the external ones generated with other 
contracting parties should be the subject of corporate law. Internally, the relationships can 
simply be defined as between shareholders and directors. All shareholders pursue profit. 
Thus, the director should act in the best interest of the corporation, which means, in the 
best interest of the shareholders, not the employees, consumers, the environment or the 
general public. Social responsibility should be a general principle or idea for social 
behavior, probably an ideology, but not a rule of corporate law. 
The government must care about employees, consumers, the environment and the 
general public, by enacting better statutes for employees to increase minimum wages, 
reduce working hours and improve working conditions, all as matters of administrative 
and labor law. It is also a government’s duty to establish better standards for the quality 
of products and consumer services which is also administrative law. It must also toughen 
standards regarding environmental policy towards improvement of environment, which is 
again the task for administrative or environmental law, but not corporate law. Corporate 
law cannot and does not have to solve these problems. Private corporations do not ask 
governments to delegate authority to them so they could perform the functions of a court 
or a parliament, because these are not their obligations. Similarly, a government should 





Nowadays, it is impossible to disprove both the shareholder primacy theory and 
the corporate social responsibility theory. The use of the theories varies from firm to firm, 
from time to time, and from case to case. However, it is possible to prioritize them. 
Shareholder primacy should be the main principle by which the management of a 
corporation carries out its duties, because this principle clearly defines directors’ duties. 
Corporate social responsibility theory is very vague and gives too much power to a 
director, but does not show how that power can be channeled. There are a minimum of 
four constituencies to be satisfied by a corporation; choosing to satisfy one of them 
means moving away from the other three. In essence, corporate social responsibility does 
not have one measure of evaluation regarding a director’s performance. The preferred 
option, however, is to have one main criteria by which to assess director performance. 
Shareholder primacy answers the question as to who is the beneficiary of a corporation, 
and whose interests the directors must protect. 
Now that the fundamental issues regarding relations between majority and 
minority shareholders, and shareholders and directors, have been discussed, it is 
necessary to focus on the shareholder’s rights and the ways to protect them. The next 







SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES: 
UKRAINIAN AND GERMAN EXAMPLES 
3.1 Introduction 
Some analysts support the position that common law countries protect their 
shareholders better than civil law jurisdictions do. According to La Porta’s rankings,93 
analysts came to the conclusion that “the quality of shareholder protection varies across 
different jurisdictions depending on which legal family system the jurisdiction belongs 
to.”94 As well, the yearly World Bank ranking of countries regarding doing business95 has 
10 indexes by which every country is assessed: starting a business; dealing with 
construction permits; getting electricity; registering property; getting credits; protecting 
investors; paying taxes; trading across borders; enforcing contracts; and resolving 
insolvency. 
  The World Bank identifies the protection of investors as an index, to help 
prospective investors choose the “correct (right) jurisdiction” for investment. This 
ranking measures the strength of minority shareholder protections against directors’ 
misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. The indicators distinguish 3 dimensions of 
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investor protections: transparency of related-party transactions, liability for self-dealing 
and shareholders’ ability to sue officers and directors for misconduct. The data for this 
ranking come from a survey of corporate and securities lawyers and are based on 
securities regulations, company laws, civil procedure codes and court rules of evidence.96 
This ranking indicates that civil law countries are far behind the common law ones. 
Canada is fifth in the world, and Germany and Ukraine are 97th and 111th respectively. 
Thus, taking Canada as an example of a well-protected shareholder jurisdiction is 
reasonable. Ukraine can and must borrow some practices from Canada on how to protect 
majority and minority shareholders alike.  
This analysis of the civil law system of shareholder protection will be unfair and 
incorrect if Canada is compared only with Ukraine. Thus, this chapter examines 
shareholder protection based on German law as well. Ukraine is an immature country 
which has been developing shareholder protection for only several decades. On the other 
hand, Germany97 has been developing its civil and commercial laws for several hundred 
years. Ukraine pursued communism, which did not have the free-market system essential 
to commerce, while Germany has long had a fully formed market system. Ukraine is one 
of the least developed countries in Europe, whereas Germany is one of the most 
developed, not only in Europe, but also in the world. Finally, most Ukrainian law schools 
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teach German civil and commercial law as the best example to emulate.  Thus, Germany 
is very well suited as an additional country to compare with Canada. 
This Chapter analyzes minority shareholder protection in civil law countries based 
on Ukrainian and German laws. It starts with general information on private companies 
and the laws which regulate corporate relations in the two countries. Then, it examines 
voting and related rights, right to information, withdrawal from a company, expulsion, 
dissolution of a company, derivative action (suit) and direct action, in Ukraine and 
Germany. The Chapter pays attention to the difference between stakes and shares in 
closely-held companies in this analysis. Finally, it discusses problems of protection in the 
civil law system that cannot be favorably resolved for minority shareholders. 
 
3.2 Private Companies in Ukraine and Germany: General information 
Before analyzing shareholder protection in Ukraine and Germany, it is necessary 
to give a short introduction of Ukraine and Germany and their corporate law. Ukraine is a 
relatively new state. It became independent from the USSR in 1991. Before independence, 
there were no private properties and, correspondingly, it was not possible for people to 
open companies. All companies were owned and controlled only by the government. As 
such, no one really examined private law, including corporate law. Furthermore, if 
someone wrote about the advantages of private property or privately owned corporations, 




by humans”, this person would automatically be inspected by the police or KGB and 
likely put in prison for the calling for overthrow of the social order. 
Thus, following the disintegration of the USSR, Ukraine simply did not have a 
good modern legal system - one that could apply to new demands such as private 
property rights and their protection, formation of companies, privatization, and so on. To 
improve the situation, especially regarding civil law, of which corporate law is a part, 
Ukrainian scholars started studying the knowledge and experience of other countries in 
order to adapt their legal system to what they learned from those countries. Ukrainians, 
like Russians, focused mainly on two branches of the civil law system – French and 
German. It is not the task of this thesis to analyze why, but eventually, Ukraine relied 
upon the German example.  
Like Germany, Ukraine has Civil and Commercial codes, which were built on the 
“pandect” basis. This means that there is the General Part, which can be used for all of a 
code’s books (chapters), and the Special Part, used for special relationships, such as 
different types of contracts. In contrast to the “pandect” system, the “institutional system” 
does not have the General Part. However, each book (chapter) has general and special 
provisions. This construction of the code is typical to French law.  
The most important normative (regulatory) instruments that govern Ukraine’s 




- Civil Code of Ukraine98 
- Commercial Code of Ukraine99 
- Civil Procedural Code of Ukraine100 
- Commercial Procedural Code of Ukraine101 
- Law “On Business Associations”102 
- Law “On Joint Stock Companies of Ukraine”103 
The most important statutes that regulate Germany’s corporate relationships 
consist of mainly the following statutes. 
- Civil Code of Germany or Burgerliches Gezetzbuch (BGB)104 
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- Commercial Code of Germany or Handelsgezetzbuch (HGB)105 
- The German Act relating to Public Companies (Aktiengezetz)106 
- The German Private Companies Act or Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaftcn 
mit beschrankter Haftung.107 
In connection with the corporate law of Ukraine and Germany, it must be noted at 
the outset that “two separate corporation statutes, each representing the basis for the 
formation and operation of a different corporation entity, exist side by side in one 
jurisdiction” 108 . These two statutes consist of the Ukrainian Law “On Business 
Associations” and The German Private Companies Act, which provide the legal basis for 
the formation and operation of private limited liability companies, and the Ukrainian Law 
“On Joint Stock Company of Ukraine” and “The German Act Relating to Public 
Companies”, which govern the formation and operation of public liability companies. In 
addition to the above-mentioned statues, which regulate different kinds of companies, 
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both of these jurisdictions must comply with the prescriptions of Civil and Commercial 
codes. 
In Ukrainian legislation, a Limited Liability Company (hereinafter LLC), is, 
according to Article 50 of the Law “On Business Associations”, a company that has 
authorized capital which is divided into stakes (not shares), the size of which is stipulated 
by the articles of incorporation.109 
A Limited Liability Company is the prevailing form of business association in 
Ukraine and Germany. Some major reasons for the popularity of this kind of legal entity 
are the following: 
-   It has a simple and relatively cheap procedure of incorporation. For example, 
there is no capital requirement for the LLC in Ukraine, which means that one 
hrn. 110 will be enough to fulfill the requirements for its authorized capital. For 
instance, an authorized capital of a Joint Stock Company in Ukraine 
constitutes 1250 minimum salaries, roughly $155 000 Canadian Dollars. A 
similar situation obtains in Germany, where there is the possibility of opening 
a company with an authorized capital of one Euro (“mini”-GmbH). However, 
the GmbH requires a minimum 25 000 euro as authorized capital, compared to 
German Joint Stock Company, which requires 50 000 euro. 
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- Shareholders have a wide discretion regarding the formation of its governance 
structures. 
- It has limited liability, a crucial factor for the shareholders. 
Compared to Canada, a Ukrainian LLC does not have shares at all. Instead of 
shares, which are a form of security, it has stakes. This feature gives rise to more 
disadvantages than advantages. The only advantage of having a stake instead of a share is 
that the incorporator does not have to pay a fee for keeping the shares in the “security 
keeper”, and does not have to open a special account with the registrar. In other words, it 
is less costly. However, because of this feature, many problems arise with succession, 
transferring, and so on. These problems will be analyzed in more detail below. 
An LLC has a wide discretion to form governance bodies. However, there is 
usually a two-tier governance structure, very similar to the Canadian system. The higher 
body is a general meeting of shareholders. The executive body is a director or board of 
directors. There is no obligation to form a supervisory board. 
Existing Ukrainian legislation does not pay attention to the duties of a director. 
For this reason, it is useful to consider the Canadian director’s obligations, which are 
stipulated in s.122 of the CBCA111. Incorporating this article into Ukrainian legislation or 
in a by-law (articles of association), would not contradict Ukrainian law. Indeed, 
providing ahead for a director’s obligations would lead to better protection for 
                                                 




shareholders. In Ukraine only a natural person, and not a legal entity, can be a director. A 
director can work on the basis of labor contracts or civil contracts. 
Pursuant to s.4 Article 23 of the Law “On Business Association”, and s.4 Article 
89 of the Commercial Code of Ukraine, the company’s officers are responsible for any 
damage they cause to the company, in scope and degree,  as stipulated by laws (statutes) 
and articles of association. Since the status of a director of the LLC can be different, 
corresponding conditions and degrees of responsibility can also vary. Because of this the 
legal rules regulating the liability of officers to the company are also different.  
Where the relationship between an officer and a company arises on the basis of a 
labor contract, the officer’s responsibility for direct damage is stipulated by the norms of 
Chapter IX of the Labor Code of Ukraine112. In this case, several conditions must obtain 
for the officer to bear responsibility: breaching labor obligations by the officer; the 
existence of direct damage; a cause-and-effect relation between breaching of obligations 
and damage; and the guilt of the officer. The absence of even one condition forecloses the 
possibility of holding the officer financially responsible. 
In the case that a relationship is derived from civil contract (that is, when an 
officer is not an employee of the company), his liability for damage is determined by 
rules stipulated in the Civil Code of Ukraine. In this case, damage means the following:  
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- losses incurred by a person as a result of destroying or damaging something, 
as well as expenses which a person has incurred or must incur in order to 
restore violated rights (real losses); 
- the loss of income a person could receive under ordinary circumstances if 
his/her/its right had not been violated (lost profit). 113 
For indemnification of any losses derived from the civil contract, the general rules 
for indemnification are used. It is important to note that the Civil Code of Ukraine does 
not stipulate guilt as a compulsory element for responsibility for damage caused by an 
officer: “The person that violated the obligation shall be responsible, provided his guilt 
(intent or negligence) is obvious, unless otherwise stipulated by the agreement or the 
law”114. Thus, it is possible to have a provision in the agreement according to which an 
officer bears liability even in the case that he or she is not guilty. However, in Ukraine 
the liability of officers are limited to indemnification for direct damage. It is worth noting 
that it is extremely rare that an officer actually indemnifies for the damage. As Roman 
Sabodosh notes, “we do not know any examples when a member of the executive body of 
the company has indemnified damage caused by the actions of a member of the executive 
body of the company. However, we have to start forming such a practice in order to avoid 
the abuse of the power by the executive members”115. 
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There are several causes of this. First, usually an interested person does not have a 
right to bring a lawsuit because of the absence of a breached right. The lawsuit can be 
brought by CEOs, shareholders, or some other person who is vested with this right in a 
by-law. However, to bring any lawsuit in Ukraine, a complainant has to show that his/her 
right has been breached. In other words, for example, a shareholder has to provide 
information that includes the way that the right has been breached.  Thus, a court usually 
declines a lawsuit with the explanation that “the court did not find any evidence which 
indicates that any rights of a complainant were breached”. Second, in almost every case, 
a director is working under a labor contract. According to the Labor Code of Ukraine an 
employee bears a financial liability to the limits of direct losses, but this liability cannot 
exceed the employee’s average monthly earnings 116 . There are, of course, some 
exceptions, but if a contract does not specify full indemnification, an employee will be 
responsible to the limit of one salary. This is why it is not worth bringing a lawsuit to 
recover losses, as a company will pay more money in lawyer and judicial fees, and so on, 
than it may recover in the suit.    
According to Article 58 (5) of the Law “On Business Associations”, a general 
meeting is required to elect the “Head of the Company”. However, statutes, by-laws, or 
recommendations do not provide any explanation as to who the “head of the company” is, 
and what his obligations are. Only one provision can be found regarding the head of the 
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company, which is Article 23 (2) of the above mentioned statute. This only says that he 
has the right to call the general meeting, chair it, and keep the minutes of the general 
meeting. This means that the by-laws or articles of association are used as the only source 
of law in this case. But a “head of a company” and its CEO should not be conflated. In 
Ukraine, these are two different persons representing the different bodies of power in a 
corporation. The CEO is the head of the executive body, while the head of a company is, 
generally speaking, much harder to identify. In Ukraine the majority of people do not 
even hear about who the head of a company is, and the majority of those who do hear 
generally think that the head of the company is the head of the executive body, in other 
words the CEO. This is not the case, though the legislators may, in reality, be referring to 
the CEO. The situation when a legislator uses words without any explanation is common 
in Ukraine. Moreover, one form of legal entity, a Business Enterprise117, is covered by 
only one provision. Even so, Business Enterprises are the second-most common form of 
legal entity in Ukraine.   
From another perspective, however, identification of the head of the company is 
not a problem at all. There are two possible solutions to this problem. The first is not to 
elect the head of the company. According to law, a general meeting shall elect the head of 
the company, but no one can force a general meeting to elect someone. Moreover, there is 
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no sanction if the corporation does not elect such a person. This is an example in which 
the law is not working properly because of the absence of sanctions.  A second way 
around the situation is to vest the rights in the head of the company as the supervisory 
board in a Joint Stock Company, and as a rule delegate the control functions of a general 
meeting to represent its interests between general meetings. The second option is better, 
because it fully fulfills relevant legal requirements and provides a “watch-dog” for the 
shareholders. 
German law does not have problems with differentiating the corporate governance 
structure because the legislation explicitly defines the corporation’s possible organs and 
moreover, stipulates their duties. According to German law a private company usually 
consists of a general meeting and board of directors (or director). 118 It is not compulsory 
to form a supervisory board in this type of company.   
For controlling a board of directors (or director), a general meeting could form an 
auditing committee and/or invite professional auditors who do not have any material 
interest in the company or any association with its shareholders. The powers of an 
auditing committee must be prescribed to foresee problems that may affect the 
shareholders. The auditing committee and the auditors must report directly to 
shareholders at a general meeting. Members of the board of directors (executive body) 
and the head of the company cannot be members of an auditing committee. A very 
                                                 




important consideration is that, without the resolution of a control body, a general 
meeting cannot approve annual reports and balance sheets.   
 
3.3 Protecting Minority Shareholders in Ukraine and Germany 
This section examines minority shareholder protection under Ukrainian and 
German law. The articles of association play a vital role in operating a corporation. 
However, the articles vary from company to company. Thus, in this section, the 
discussion of minority shareholder protection is mainly based on statutory provisions. 
The discussion highlights the problems existing in Ukrainian and German corporate law, 
but does not offer solutions to them. Further sections suggest possible ways of solving 
problems. 
As mentioned, minority shareholders can be oppressed by the majority as well as 
by management. Therefore, it is necessary to examine minority shareholder protection in 
two contexts. The first is in terms of the relationship between the majority and minority 
shareholders, and the second involves the relationship between management and minority 
shareholders.  
Corporate law theory has many remedies for minority shareholder oppression, 
such as voting rights (cumulative voting, class voting and voting rights under squeeze-




order, investigation, dissolution, right to examine a company’s documentation, 
cancellation of contracts, cancellation of general meeting decisions and other remedies.  
Professor Sarah Bradley rightly mentions in her Commentary on the Nova Scotia 
Companies Act, that the right to vote at meetings is a fundamental right granted to 
shareholders119. Thus, this section starts by examining voting rights. 
3.3.1 Voting and Related Rights 
The voting right is the fundamental and most important right belonging to 
shareholders. This right is exercised by shareholders in general meetings. A general 
meeting is considered the highest (supreme) body120 within the corporation. In Ukraine, 
the decision of a general meeting binds for all of a company’s members. 
A Ukrainian LLC does not have shares; instead it has stakes. Thus, in the general 
meeting, one stake comes with one vote. This formula works in every Ukrainian LLC and 
cannot be changed. There are no ordinary, preference or class stakes. Each stake is equal 
and carries the same rights. Everyone who has a stake in a company is counted as a 
member of the company. According to Article 50 of the Law “On Business 
Associations”121 a company shall not have more than 100 members. In the event that 
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membership exceeds this number, a limited liability company shall be subject to 
transformation into a Joint Stock company within one year and, upon the expiration of 
this term, to liquidation by prosecution if the number of its members does not decrease to 
the established limit.122 
According to Article 145 of the Civil Code, the exclusive competence of the 
general meeting of a limited liability company includes the following: 
1) determining the main directions of activities of the limited liability company 
and approving its plans and reports on their fulfillment; 
2) amending the company's articles and changing the amount of authorized capital; 
3) forming and recalling the company's executive body; 
4) establishing forms of supervision over the activities of the executive body, as 
well as creating and establishing the powers of the respective supervisory bodies; 
5) approving annual reports and balance sheets and distributing the company’s 
profits and losses; 
6) resolving any issue of acquisition of a participant’s share (stake) by the 
company; 
7) expelling a member from the company; 
8) making a decision on the liquidation of the company, appointing the liquidation 
committee, and approving the liquidation balance sheet. 
                                                 




The articles of association of the company and the law may give exclusive 
competence to a general meeting to make decisions on other issues. Issues coming under 
the exclusive competence of the company’s general meeting cannot be delegated to the 
company’s executive body. 
The decision of the general meeting is adopted if more than 50 per cent of a 
quorum voted for it. A quorum constitutes 60 per cent of members.  In some cases, such 
as amending the company's articles, changing the amount of the authorized capital, 
expelling a member from the company, making a decision on liquidation of the company 
and certain other matters,123 a decision shall be adopted by a majority of no less than 50 
per cent of votes by existing shareholders (not a quorum). By-laws (articles) can specify a 
higher percentage for adopting a decision, but cannot reduce it.  
Many countries foresee cumulative voting as a compulsory type of voting when 
electing directors. As Kevin McGuiness explains, “Cumulative voting is a system of 
voting under which each elector has a number of votes determined by reference to the 
number of officers that are to be filled by election, with the elector being free to distribute 
those votes among such number of persons or concentrate those votes on any one person, 
as the elector may see fit”124.  
According to Ukrainian law there, is no compulsory cumulative voting regarding 
any important decision. Of course, by-laws can provide for cumulative voting; however, 
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practice shows that this kind of voting is extremely rare, and generally speaking, its rarity 
is understandable. First, majorities do not have incentive to share their power. Second, 
many people do not know that cumulative voting is a possibility. It first appeared as an 
option in Ukrainian law in 2008 with the enactment of the law “On Joint Stock 
Companies”, which provides that unless the by-laws otherwise specify, members of the 
board of directors and supervisory boards are elected by cumulative voting125. But again, 
by-laws can change this rule and may not provide the minority with real participation in 
the election of directors. Moreover, the Law “On Joint Stock Companies” does not apply 
to an LLC. The Civil Code and the Law “On Business Associations” do not mention 
cumulative voting. However, because civil law is private law, meaning that a person can 
do anything not prohibited, the inclusion of cumulative voting in the company’s by-laws 
will not contradict Ukrainian legislation. However, as mentioned, the cumulative voting 
provision is rare in regard to Ukrainian LLCs. 
The same position regarding cumulative voting exists in Germany. German 
legislation does not stipulate compulsory cumulative voting when electing a board of 
directors. However, it is also not prohibited.  Thus, by-laws may provide for compulsory 
cumulative voting in some cases. 
Because a Ukrainian LLC does not consist of shares, there is no class voting at all. 
All shareholders have the same rights; the only difference is in the number of the stakes 
and a resulting difference in influence on decision making. As we know, shareholders 
carry out their voting rights at general meetings. Consequently, the right to convene the 
                                                 




meeting and to make proposals to meeting agendas is important and related to voting 
rights. 
Ukrainian law provides for the procedure of calling a general meeting at 
shareholders’ request. Pursuant to Article 61,126 shareholders who overall have more than 
20 per cent127 of votes may request to call a general meeting at any time and for any 
reasons that relate to the company’s operations (activities). If the “head of the company” 
does not meet their request within 25 days, the shareholders who made the request may 
call a general meeting. The only problem is that the legislation is silent on the question of 
reimbursing expenses incurred by shareholders connected with calling a meeting. Thus, 
unless otherwise agreed upon in by-laws, shareholders who intend to call a meeting have 
to be ready to pay for the preparation of the meeting, and no one is required to reimburse 
them for their expenses. As each coin has two sides, the issue of reimbursement is 
seemingly irresolvable: Some think that if a shareholder has a right to convene a meeting, 
he/she should not pay for exercising of this right. Others are sure, however, that if a 
shareholder can at any time call a meeting and does not have to pay for it, he/she can 
simply abuse his/her right, which will negatively affect the company.  
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The other problem connected to the right to call a meeting is when shareholders 
who could call the meeting do not indicate when they want to convene the meeting. In 
other words, a shareholder submits a request to the “head of the company” requesting the 
convening of the general meeting in the following way: “… thus, based on 
aforementioned, I request to convene the general meeting”. The head of the company 
responds to say that upon consideration of the application, he/she has assigned the day of 
the meeting to be six months from now.  According to Ukrainian law, a director has not 
breached any law in this case and, moreover, has complied with the request, because de 
jure, he/she fixed a date for the meeting.  If this happens, a shareholder cannot do 
anything except wait. 
In Germany the procedure of calling a general meeting is slightly different. 
According to Paragraph 37 of Civil Code of Germany, shareholders who overall have 
more than 10 per cent of votes may request to call a general meeting at any time and for 
any reasons that relate to the company’s operations (activities)128. If the request is not 
granted, the local court may authorize the members who made the request to convene the 
meeting; it may make orders on the conduct of the chairmanship at the meeting.129  
 Making a proposal to the agenda of the general meeting is the next right relating 
to voting. The right of a shareholder to make a proposal means that a shareholder is 
entitled to submit to the corporation any questions that must be raised at the general 
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meeting. In Ukraine any shareholder, no matter the per cent of votes that he/she has, can 
propose any questions for the general meeting agenda. The only requirement for this is 
time. A shareholder has to submit his/her question to the company not less than 25 days 
before the meeting. There is no possibility for a director or the “head of the company” to 
refuse a shareholder’s proposals. Moreover, Ukrainian legislation foresees the possibility 
of adding some questions to the agenda of the meeting on the date of meeting, but only 
on the condition that all shareholders present at the meeting agree.130  
 In contrast to Ukraine, the German Private Limited Companies Act in 
Paragraph 50131 stipulates that a number of members, the aggregate amount of whose 
shares is not less than a tenth of the company's capital, have a right to demand that a 
particular matter should be placed on the agenda for a meeting. As can be seen, Ukrainian 
legislation vests any shareholders with this right; while German law gives this right only 
to the majority with no less than 10 per cent of the company’s capital. 
In practice, this right could create problems in its exercise. A head of the company 
or director must notify shareholders of a meeting no less than 30 days before the meeting. 
Electronic notification is not appropriate notification in Ukraine. In other words, fax, 
skype, telephone or e-mail cannot be used by a corporation to notify shareholders. Post 
(paper) and publication in the newspaper or journal are the usual means of notification in 
Ukraine. But there is no compulsory provision about publication, and if the by-laws 
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provide for publication as a means of notifying shareholders, it may not solve all the 
problems. A director or the “head of the company”, if he/she wants to exclude the 
possibility of adding a question to the agenda, may simply publish a notice in a 
newspaper that no one knows, or in a newspaper where this notification is least expected 
to appear, such as in the “Ukrainian Beekeeper” or “Wines of Ukraine”. The only 
requirement is that the newspaper should be national, not local. Of course, in this 
situation, a shareholder will not be informed in time, if at all. The same tactic can be used 
to exclude “undesirable” shareholders from voting. In this situation, when there is a 
publication somewhere, according to law, a shareholder is considered as having been 
notified and a court cannot help, because a company has fulfilled the requirements.  
Using the mail may also cause problems of late notification for proposals.  For 
example, a “head of the company” may intentionally send the 30 days’ notification at the 
end of the day on Friday. The notification will have been lying in the post office for three 
days without any movement (Friday, Saturday, and Sunday), plus 3-4 days for delivery. 
In such case the total number of postage days is more than five, and as we know, the 
shareholder’s proposal for an agenda should be submitted no less than 25 days before the 
meeting. Thus, the director can simply deprive shareholders of the proposal right and, 
generally speaking, an aggrieved shareholder can do almost nothing because her right is 
not abused and everything was done within the scope of the law.  
As can be seen, there are many problems regarding voting rights in Ukraine and 
Germany.  Generally speaking, almost all of these problems can be solved easily by 




suitable solutions to them. In fact, these problems have to be solved as soon as possible, 
because voting is a fundamental right, one of the most important. Furthermore, voting is 
the only possible means by which shareholders can participate in the management of the 
corporation. The absence of real participation by the minority in the management of a 
corporation could lead to abuse of this right by the majority and the director.  
3.3.2 Right to Information 
Access to information is noted as a major problem for minority shareholders. On 
this issue, it is observed that “asymmetric information and no access to financial 
statements in particular is a fiendish problem that a minority shareholder frequently 
encounters in the real world”132. It frequently happens that the majority gives an order or 
instruction for management not to provide any documents regarding a company’s 
activities to the minority, especially about pecuniary matters. The majority, in this case, is 
motivated by two main concerns. The first is that they do not want to disclose some 
important information to the minority that can be used by an outsider, for example. The 
second is that the majority feel they are the sole owners of the corporation and do not 
think it necessary to share with the minority information regarding the company.  
The Ukrainian Law “On Business Associations” stipulates the possibility of 
protecting the right to information. Pursuant to Article 10 (г), each shareholder has the 
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right to receive information about a company’s activities. On the request of a member of 
a company, the company shall provide that member with the annual balance, reports 
about company activities and protocols (reports) of meetings of shareholders. This is the 
full list of information that it is compulsory to divulge. As to other information such as 
contracts, original accounting evidence, accounting books and other financial reports, 
Ukrainian law is silent. Thus, it follows that a director of a company decides on his own 
whether to provide this other information or not. It is likely, when the majority “kindly 
ask” the director not give any information to the minority, that the director will refuse 
minority shareholders’ requests for additional information. 
In the case they are denied information about the annual balance, reports about 
company activities and protocols (reports) of meetings of shareholders, the minority is 
able to bring a lawsuit, which should be quickly and positively resolved for them.  
Audit inspection of annual financial reports is connected with the right to 
information. According to Article 146 of the Civil law of Ukraine,133 on the request of 
any participant of the company, the annual financial statements of the company may be 
audited by a professional auditor not related to the company or to its participants by 
property interests. This article also says that expenditures for such an audit shall be 
charged to the participant on whose request the audit is carried out, unless otherwise 
established by the company’s by-laws. As we know, an audit is not an inexpensive 
process. Thus, the cost can be, and often is, the deterrent for the minority shareholders to 
                                                 




use this right.  However, from a legal point of view, Ukrainian law empowers each 
shareholder to exercise this power. 
In Germany shareholders’ right to information is an integral part of the right to 
convene a general meeting. The general rule is that each shareholder shall upon request 
be provided with information at the shareholders’ meeting by the management board 
regarding the company’s affairs, to the extent that such information is necessary to permit 
a proper evaluation of the relevant item on the agenda. A general meeting must approve 
the year’s balance sheet, thus, shareholders must be provided with the annual balance, 
reports about company’s affairs and, in general, no more information. Moreover, because 
shareholders participate in voting during a general meeting, it is clear that they have a 
right to examine protocols (reports) of any meeting of shareholders. It follows that the 
director of a company decides on his own whether or not this information is necessary to 
permit a proper evaluation on the relevant item on the agenda. Hence, he/she has the 
power not to provide the minority shareholders with some information. In principle, the 
situation with the right to information is similar in Ukraine and Germany. The only 
difference is that in Ukraine a shareholder may carry out this right at any time, but, in 
Germany, only before a general meeting.  
As can be seen, the right to information in Ukraine and Germany is not 
adequately elaborated and needs to be developed. Information in many situations is more 




3.3.3 Withdrawal from the Company 
The right to withdraw from the company is extremely significant to the minority. 
This is the last means for minority shareholders to protect themselves against the majority. 
It is more accurate to say that in this way, the minority does not, actually, protect 
themselves, but rather takes steps not to lose more than they may already have. It is not a 
secret that the majority may take measures to secure the lawful oppression of the minority 
for the purpose of throwing out the minority from the company, and their efforts are often 
crowned with success. In this situation the minority, in order not to aggravate the 
relationship between shareholders and management, does not have any choice but to 
withdraw from the company.  
Ukrainian law draws much attention to the withdrawal right and stipulates it in the 
Civil Code, Commercial Code and in the Law “On Business Associations”. The Civil 
Code of Ukraine provides the most detail on this procedure. It allows the shareholders of 
a company to withdraw from the company by notifying the company of their withdrawal 
not later than three months prior to the withdrawal, unless otherwise provided in by-
laws.134 However, according to Article 100 of the Civil Code, the articles of association 
cannot stipulate that notification shall be made more than one year prior to the 
withdrawal. If such a by-law were passed, it would be invalid. In essence the notification 
would have to be made not later than three months and not earlier than one year from 
withdrawal. The shareholder that withdraws from a company has the right to receive the 
                                                 




value of the part of its property pro rata to her share in the authorized capital of the 
company. The agreement between the participant and the company may stipulate that the 
participant’s share may be replaced with a property transfer in kind135. In the case that a 
contribution to the authorized capital was made by means of transfer of the right to use 
property, the respective property shall be returned to the participant without recompense. 
The procedure and the method of establishing the value of part of the property pro rata to 
the participant’s share in the authorized capital, as well as the procedure and the terms of 
its payment, may be established by the articles. If the by-laws do not have any provision 
regarding the procedure of valuation of the stakes, it is regulated by statutes. 
The procedure of withdrawal is outlined in detail in the Recommendation from 
28.12.2007 № 04-5/14, “Regarding the practice of the implementation of legislation 
during litigation proceedings occurring from corporate relations”136, which was issued by 
the Presidium of the Supreme Commercial Court of Ukraine. 
According to Ukrainian law, legal facts137 divide into actions and events138. An 
action is something that depends on the will of a person, for example, signing a contract. 
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An event is something that does not depend on the will of a person, for instance a death 
or a hurricane. Transmission of the application to withdraw from a company is an action, 
which is intended to cease the rights and obligations of a shareholder as a member of a 
company139. This right does not depend on the will of other shareholders or a company. It 
should be taken into account that a shareholder is considered to be leaving a company 
from the moment when the general meeting approves a resolution regarding the 
withdrawal of such a shareholder. In the absence of such a resolution, a person is 
considered to be leaving a company from the date of expiration of his/her term, which is 
stipulated by the statutes or by-laws of a company regarding notification for withdrawal 
from a company140.   
In Ukraine, a court decision is binding only on the litigants. There are, however, 
several exceptions. First are decisions from the Constitutional Court of Ukraine. Second, 
there were several amendments to existing procedural law in 2009, and after 2009, cases 
considered by Supreme Court of Ukraine can, theoretically, be used as precedents for 
subsequent judicial decisions in similar situations.  Recommendations of Supreme Courts 
(The Supreme Court of Ukraine, The Supreme Commercial Court and The Supreme 
Administrative Court) are not compulsory and should be used only as guidance. However, 
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in reality, the Supreme Court’s recommendations, in their opinions, are “higher than 
statutes”. This applies to the “Recommendation” mentioned above.  For example, the 
Court says that if there is no resolution in a meeting regarding the withdrawal of a 
shareholder who has submitted an application to withdraw, a shareholder is considered to 
be leaving the company on the date of expiration of a term as stipulated by the statutes or 
by-laws of the company for giving notification for withdrawal from the company.  But 
there is no provision to support the position of the Supreme Court. Moreover, it is also 
impossible to fulfill. This is because the articles of association of a company include the 
names of shareholders; thus, if someone withdraws from the company, the appropriate 
changes should be made to the articles. Changing the articles of associations lies in the 
exclusive power of the company general meeting. Moreover, the changes to the articles 
of association are valid, not after a resolution of the meeting, but after a registration of the 
necessary changes in the Registrar’s Office. Therefore, the withdrawal application of a 
shareholder is not an appropriate document for the Registrar, and it cannot make changes 
to the by-laws.  
An application to withdraw from a company is a form of realization of a right, 
provided by legislation, but not a contract141. Because of this feature, no one can say this 
application is invalid, due to the absence of such a protection in Ukrainian law142. Only 
agreements can be invalid, according to legislation.   
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In Germany it can be noted that the statute provides only general provisions 
regarding the withdrawal remedy. According to Article 39 of the Civil Code of Germany, 
members have the right to leave an association, and the articles of an association may 
specify that leaving is permissible only at the end of a business year, or only after a notice 
period. It also provides that the maximum notice period is two years143. 
 Theory and practice have developed the withdrawal right, which was recognized 
by the judiciary.144 In Ukraine, if a shareholder wants to use this right, she/he will only 
have to notify a company in appropriate time if otherwise stipulated in the by-laws. In 
Germany, in addition to notification, a shareholder must provide substantial grounds 
(wichtige Grund) to leave a company. Wichtige Grund is a key concept in German 
regulation; it determines whether a shareholder can use the right to withdraw from a 
company or not. Wichtige Grund in a withdrawal proceeding may be established through 
any of the following categories145: personal characteristics of the departing shareholder; 
behavior of other shareholders; or the existence of special factors 146 . The personal 
characteristics of the departing shareholder may include “financial need, illness, 
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relocation and inability to fulfill the shareholder role”147. The second category - the 
behavior of other shareholders - may encompass “the arbitrary exercise of majority power 
or continuation of a dispute among shareholders”148. The existence of special factors - the 
last category that can be considered as Wichtige Grund - includes, for example, lack of 
long-term returns on a shareholder’s investment or a change in the purpose of the 
company.149 It is important to note that this is not an exhaustive list of the grounds that 
can be considered as Wichtige Grund. Significantly, as Carol Kline indicates, “neither 
fault nor exclusion from decision making are necessary to establish Wichtige Grung, 
thereby making Wichtige Grund broader than U.S. notions of fiduciary duties”150. It is 
worth mentioning that the articles could also provide the right for withdrawal under 
specific conditions. However, the articles can only amplify the right of withdrawal, but 
they cannot restrict or eliminate it151. In other words, no one can take this right from a 
shareholder: “This right has been grounded on the general principle of good faith and on 
consideration of respect to long-term relationships that an individual must be able to 
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terminate them when the circumstances on the basis of which they were entered have 
permanently and negatively changed”152. 
As can be seen, German law provides a more complicated procedure than 
Ukrainian law for this, because it includes one additional requirement, that is, 
establishing substantial grounds. In view of this additional requirement, Ukrainian 
legislation by comparison much more easily protects the minority. 
 In Ukraine, according to Article 54 of the Law “On Business Association,” in 
the case of the withdrawal of a shareholder from a company, he/she has to receive the 
value of his part of the company proportional to his stake in the authorized capital of the 
company. In addition to this, a shareholder must receive a part of the profit for the last 
number of years. The valuation of her part has to be carried out on the day that a 
shareholder submits the application.  
The biggest problem regarding this right is how to evaluate the stake of a 
shareholder. There are several possible ways to do this. The first and the best is by 
agreement. In this case, a shareholder and a company, which is usually represented by the 
majority shareholders (because they make appropriate changes to the by-laws), negotiate 
all the conditions. This works when a shareholder wants to leave a company by his own 
will, in other words, when a shareholder does not have any serious problems with the 
other shareholders or with the directors, but needs to leave because of some circumstance, 
such a shortage of money, leaving the country, etc.      
                                                 




In most cases, however, the minority uses this right as a remedy against a 
company. It is likely in this situation that no one wants to sit at the negotiation table, and 
so, a legal proceeding is inevitable. Disputes arising in connection with the withdrawal of 
a participant from a company, including disputes over the procedure for determining 
his/her share in the authorized capital, its amount, and terms of payment, must be decided 
by the court. 
 In paragraph 3.7 of the Recommendations of the Supreme Commercial Court, the 
Court gives guidance on how to evaluate the value of the shares. If the by-laws of a 
company do not provide the procedure for how to evaluate the share of a withdrawing 
shareholder, the following procedure must be used. According to Article 190 of the Civil 
Code of Ukraine, property as a specific object shall be considered a separate thing, or a 
set of things, as with property rights and obligations. According to Article 66 of the 
Commercial Code of Ukraine, a company’s property shall include production and non-
production assets, as well as other values, the cost of which shall be reflected in a 
separate balance sheet of the company. Article 66 of the Commercial Code must not be 
used independently, and has to be analyzed together with Article 190 of Civil Code and 
Article 139 of Commercial Code, for the following reasons.  Article 66 of Commercial 
Code takes credits (loans) from banks and other lenders as resources constituting a 
company’s property. It is reasonable not to count the credits, but to count only equity 
capital. For example, if a company has an authorized capital 1000 dollars and takes one 
million dollars as credit, this does not mean that a shareholder who has 10% should 




Thus, the value of the part of a company that should be paid to a shareholder who 
withdraws from a company must be calculated from the value of the whole property 
belonging to a company, including fixed assets, intangible assets, floating assets, non-
production assets and so on, and also taking into consideration all the liabilities and 
obligations of a company.   
 The evaluation of assets is a complicated procedure, which is why Ukrainian 
law stipulates the possibility of hiring a professional valuator. The problem regarding a 
valuator is who has to pay for the valuation. Most likely, this is the person who hires the 
valuator, and most probably, this person is a minority shareholder.  
 Payment, in the procedure of withdrawal, must be made after approval of the 
annual report, for the year in which a shareholder withdrew from a company and in a 
term of not more 12 months from the day of such withdrawal153. Ukrainian law, as well 
as German law, imposes an obligation to pay a fair price to a shareholder who withdraws 
from a company. However, the question of what is fair is a complicated one that in many 
situations is not easy to decide. For instance, a small law firm that has five shareholders, 
each of whom owns twenty per cent and one of whom wants to withdraw from this 
company that has generated one million dollars of net profit for the last year, and which 
owns just five tables, chairs, printers, and laptops, and rents its office, would have 
difficulty evaluating its price. The firm’s value is more than its tables, chairs, printers and 
laptops. But according to the Ukrainian law, this should be the value of the company. But 
obviously, the value of these tangible assets is not a fair price for the company. The 
                                                 




company has its reputation or “goodwill”, which is not reflected in its balance sheet, and 
this can substantially increase its value. It is not the task of the thesis to define the best 
formula for valuation; however, the problem with valuation is a noteworthy one. In many 
situations it is impossible to assert that a fair price will be arrived at by using formulas 
provided in law. The question of a fair price is a major weakness and, thus, is one the 
biggest problems of this remedy, which can put minority shareholders at a disadvantage. 
 
3.3.4 Expulsion Right 
 Various events in a person’s life can change his/her position in a company and 
his/her relations with its members. It is not rare that because of some conflict between 
shareholders, or between shareholders and directors, one acts in a way that may 
negatively affect the corporation and, as a consequence, its shareholders. Simple 
examples of such actions are: not complying with the company’s articles; not executing 
the resolutions of a general meeting; and disclosing a commercial secret or some 
confidential information about the company’s activities. 
 With regard to some actions by a shareholder, civil law theory makes it possible 
to exclude some shareholders from a company, irrespectively of their wishes. In Ukraine, 
this remedy is stipulated in Article 64 of the Law “On Business Associations”. This 
provides that the shareholder of a company who systematically fails to fulfill, or poorly 
fulfills, obligations imposed on him/her by the company, or prevents the achievement of 
the company’s goals through her actions or omissions, may be expelled from the 




resolution to that effect. This shareholder would not participate in the vote on this 
decision154. 
 In light of the above it is necessary to set out the duties of shareholders in 
Ukrainian companies. The following Article from the Civil Code of Ukraine says the 
following: 
 Article 117. Obligations of the members of company 
 
1. Company members shall be obliged to: 
 
1) follow the company’s constituent document and execute resolutions 
of the general meeting; 
 
2) fulfill their obligations to the company, including those connected 
with property participation, as well as make contributions (pay for 
the shares) in the amount and according to the procedure and by 
means provided by the constituent document; 
 
3) not to disclose commercial secrets and confidential information about 
the company’s activity. 
 
2.  Company members may also have other obligations specified by 
the constituent documents and the law.155 
 
 Obviously, statutory law imposes few obligations on shareholders. They have 
no duties to act in the best interest of the company, act fairly in respect of the minority, 
and so on. However, Article 117 (2) above foresees the possibility of imposing some 
other duties on shareholders. Nonetheless, constituent documents prepared by 
shareholders are unlikely to increase the number of duties that they have to fulfill. 
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 The other cause of exclusion from a company which is stipulated in Article 64 
is the prevention, by a shareholder’s actions (or omissions), of the achievement of a 
company’s goals. This is very broad notion, and it could give room to the majority to 
abuse the rights of a shareholder. Theoretically, under this notion can be included any 
action by a shareholder, such as his/her not coming to the meeting, not voting on some 
question, and so on. The most common formulation of the reason for expulsion in the 
resolution of a general meeting, is the “impossibility of achievement of company goals 
because of systematic absence of the shareholder in meetings, which makes it impossible 
to pass some resolution”. Another common formulation is this: “Because a company’s 
administration is carried out through its organs, and a general meeting of shareholders is 
the main body, making decisions in the meeting is the duty of shareholders. In light of 
this, for the systematic non-fulfillment of obligations, which prevents the achievement of 
company goals, a general meeting passed a resolution according to which the shareholder 
has to be excluded from the company”.   
 The author of this thesis, strongly disagrees with the position that a person can 
be excluded from the company for not attending meetings or for not voting for some 
special question. To vote or not to vote is the right of each shareholder, whether he/she 
has 1 per cent or 100 per cent of votes, and no one can force a shareholder to come to a 
meeting. Moreover, no one, not even a court, can force a shareholder to cast his/her vote 
for any question. This is unacceptable. Indeed, Article 117 of Civil Code of Ukraine does 
not stipulate attendance of meetings as a duty of shareholders. Furthermore, the 




expulsion of a shareholder from a company on the ground of not attending the general 
shareholders’ meeting.156     
 It must be pointed out that this remedy is available to only the majority in 
Ukraine. It flows from the statute157, which foresees that the decision regarding exclusion 
of a shareholder shall be passed in a meeting by not less than 50 per cent of all current 
shareholders. Thus, this remedy can only be used by the majority.  
A resolution regarding the expulsion of a shareholder from a company shall 
include reasons for the exclusion, and must specify some act of failure to comply with the 
by-laws or duties as grounds for the exclusion of the shareholder. The resolution must 
also specify which facts show systematic non-fulfillment of a shareholder’s duties and/or 
which actions (or omissions) prevent the achievement of company goals. The absence of 
corresponding information in the resolution regarding the exclusion of a shareholder from 
a company can be grounds for the nullification of such a resolution by a court where the 
shareholder brings a lawsuit158.     
The recommendation of the Supreme Commercial Court of Ukraine provides a 
very important ruling, according to which, in the case of legal proceedings regarding 
exclusion of a shareholder from the company, commercial courts have to take into 
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account that making a decision regarding exclusion of a shareholder from a company is 
the exclusive power of a company shareholders’ meeting, and is not the power of a 
commercial court. Thus, a court should only examine the legitimacy and validity 
(reasonableness) of the meeting’s resolution in the case where the excluded shareholder 
brings a lawsuit to challenge the validity of the resolution159 . It must be noted that 
shareholders in a Joint Stock Company do not have a right to exclude shareholders in 
Ukraine.  
According to Ukrainian legislation, the resolution to expel a shareholder should 
be passed by shareholders, and should not be approved by a court or some other public 
authority. Because of the significance of such an action, there should be some control 
over it by a public authority. This is to prevent the majority shareholders from abusing 
their rights and so offer increased protection to the minority.  
German law also foresees the possibility of excluding a shareholder from a 
company. This remedy, as well as withdrawal, were developed by the court from the right 
of dissolution of the company. Thus, this remedy can be used only with court approval. 
Compared to Ukraine where the resolution to expel is valid when more than 50 per cent 
votes for it, in Germany the resolution must be approved by a court.   





As in the withdrawal right, expulsion can also be authorized by a company's 
articles; however, the articles may not restrict or eliminate the right of expulsion160. This 
right is guaranteed by law.  
If a company’s articles do not provide for the procedure, German courts have 
applied the following elements and the approaches required to fulfill this procedure. First, 
a company’s meeting must vote for the exclusion of a shareholder from the company. 
The general trend among German courts is to require a supermajority of votes for such a 
motion to carry. As this right is derived from the right to dissolve a company, the 
procedure of dissolution of a company shall be used by analogy for the expulsion 
procedure. A supermajority constitutes 3/4161 of the voting shareholders. In other words, 
a minimum of 75 per cent of shareholder votes is compulsory to pass such a resolution162. 
The shareholder to be excluded cannot vote on the resolution. This is why “the minority 
shareholders […] can force the management of the company by a resolution to initiate 
proceedings against the majority shareholder and exclude him/her from the company”163. 
In contrast to Ukraine, in Germany the minority can, theoretically, expel the majority 
from the corporation. Although expulsion is a decision made in the company's name, the 
right to determine company policy inherent in owning a majority share is not upheld in 
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this context164. The possibility for the minority to exclude the majority is confirmed by a 
landmark case, which held that: 
It can therefore happen that a majority shareholder can be expelled by the 
court upon the decision of a minority if a substantial basis is present. The 
view of the complaint that it would be grotesque for the minority to be 
able to expel a shareholder who holds a majority overlooks the fact that a 
majority position in the company is no carte blanche for conduct in 
violation of company norms (gesellschaftswidriges Verhalten)165. 
 
The main requirement for obtaining the expulsion of a shareholder, like that for 
withdrawal, is the existence and proof of a substantial basis (Wichtige Grund). Since 
expulsion is carried out against the will of the affected shareholder, the scope of 
circumstances that may constitute a substantial basis is narrower than in the case of 
withdrawal. In the case of expulsion, the substantial basis must lie in the person of the 
shareholder to be expelled: 
Postwar German courts and commentators have resorted to the remedy of 
expulsion in cases involving factors such as advanced age, extended 
illness, or mental derangement that make participation in the affairs of the 
company infeasible. In addition to characteristics such as these, a 
shareholder's behavior or financial circumstances can also constitute a 
Wichtige Grund. Examples of these factors include lack of trustworthiness 
or creditworthiness, disorganized financial circumstances, the loss of 
personal qualifications mandated by the articles, dereliction of duty, 
breach of trust, causing incurable dissension among the shareholders, 
making improper sexual advances, and the like”166.  
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It is important to note that, in Germany, such substantial bases include misconduct 
and fault on the part of the expelled shareholder. In these situations it is not hard to justify 
the expulsion. Yet other reasons for expulsion exist: “Courts and commentators have 
consistently held that misbehavior or fault, while constituting a substantial basis, is not a 
necessary element for expulsion. Many of the actionable bases listed above involve no 
notion of fault whatsoever”167; for example, old age, financial difficulties, and situations 
in which the continued presence of one shareholder is intolerable for the others. Also, 
German courts pay attention to the relationship between the expelled shareholder and 
others. The most common justification is to show to the court that a company cannot 
work normally because of some shareholder, and justification constitutes the 
unbearableness standard (unertrdglich). As can be seen, this is also a very vague and 
broad notion, which gives very significant power to judges, and shareholders who want to 
expel someone from a company.  
In both Ukrainian and German legislation, an expelled shareholder must be paid 
the value of his/her share. Common practice is to fix a market value, but as was 
considered in the previous remedy, it is hard, if not impossible, to determine what this 
value should be. 
In contrast to Ukraine, German legislation makes it possible to expel the majority 
from the company. However, it is more a hypothetical possibility than a real one. It is 
hard to imagine that the minority can find enough money to pay to the majority upon its 
expulsion.  





Another problem with this remedy is the high probability that the majority will 
expel the “unnecessary” (undesirable) minority from a company, especially in Ukraine, 
where there is no obligation to approve the resolution by the court decision. The scheme 
regarding exclusion of the minority works in the following way in Ukraine. The majority 
makes amendments to the articles of association, thereby imposing more obligations on 
current shareholders. This is fully lawful, because the Civil Code of Ukraine explicitly 
foresees this possibility in Article 117, which says that company members may have 
other obligations specified by constituent documents and the law. This allows for as 
many duties as possible to be imposed on shareholders. Examples of such duties include 
that shareholders must be present at each director’s meeting to “help” the directors make 
decisions; or that each shareholder must attend all training provided by the company; or 
that each shareholder must notify the company and its shareholders about any credits 
taken by his/her family. After amendments to the articles, the majority can simply wait 
for the breach of some duty, and can even  increase the likelihood of this by, for example, 
scheduling  training days when some shareholders are not able to come. After 2-3 formal 
“breaches” of duties, the majority can convene a meeting to exclude an “offending” 
shareholder. Under the law, this is a “neat job” (clean job), and usually the excluded 
shareholder cannot protect his right to membership. This is because the civil law system 
is a normative or formal law system where there is no overriding concept of justice. If, in 
a civil law country, a statute says that a murder is legal, it means that no one can be 
arrested or put in prison for murder despite its immorality and unfairness. Thus, if 
everything is formally or procedurally correct, an oppressed shareholder cannot protect 




In Germany, the success of the foregoing contrivance is less probable because of 
the need for court approval, thought it is still possible. In a civil law country, a court 
cannot interpret the law, and it cannot go beyond the scope of the plaintiff’s claim. In our 
case, if an excluded shareholder asks the court to invalidate the resolution, he/she has to 
show the court evidence to confirm the breach of a procedure, or a breach of his/her 
shareholder rights. Assumptions, moral principles and unfairness are not valid evidence 
in Ukraine and in Germany.  A judge must cite laws, and if there is no breach of law, any 
action is correct and legal because of the private law principle that it is possible to do 
anything not prohibited by the law. 
 
3.3.5 Dissolution of a Company 
The dissolution of a company involves winding up corporate affairs, selling the 
corporation’s assets, paying corporate debt, and distributing the remaining capital to 
shareholders on a pro rata basis168. Dissolutions of companies are traditionally divided 
into two categories: voluntary dissolution and involuntary dissolution. 
One task of this thesis is to show how the minority shareholder can protect 
himself/herself. As such, this section examines involuntary dissolution, which is initiated 
by a shareholder and should be considered by the courts.   
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Professor Sarah Bradley rightly points out that dissolution, as a remedy, is the 
“most drastic and will generally only be awarded when other remedies would be 
inappropriate or inadequate”169. It is true that this remedy should be awarded only in 
extreme situations and very rarely. If we recognize that a company is a separate person 
from any of its shareholders, and that if it is able to continue operating, a court must try to 
award some other remedy than dissolution. Only after the impossibility of different 
remedies to deal with identified problems should a court award dissolution. It is 
commonly said in Ukraine that: “A bad peace is better than a good war”. That is why a 
court, by its action, must seek to ensure the continued operation of a company. 
 As a remedy, dissolution is completely unknown to Ukrainian law. According 
to Ukrainian law, a company can be liquidated in the following situations: 
- in connection with the expiration of the term and the achievement of the goal for 
which this legal entity has been created170    
- by the decision of the court in recognition of the legal entity’s ineffective state 
registration due to violations made in the course of its creation that cannot be 
removed171 
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- if the value of a legal entity’s property is insufficient to meet creditors’ demands, 
the legal entity shall be liquidated according to the procedure established by the 
law for the renewal of its solvency or recognition of its bankruptcy172 
- by the resolution of a general meeting of shareholders;173 
- in case of exceeding a certain number of shareholders;174 
- based on other reasons stipulated in the articles. 
Given the above, there is no provision regarding the possibility for minority 
shareholders to bring a claim for dissolution in order to protect their interests. However, 
theoretically the articles of association may provide such a remedy. Even so, the majority 
shareholders are not likely to stipulate the possibility to dissolve a corporation in any 
other circumstances, and thereby give more rights to the minority.  
 In Germany the case with dissolution is somewhat different than in Ukraine. 
According to the Private Limited Liability Company Act, a company can be dissolved 
under the following circumstances175: 
- expiration of the period specified for its duration in the articles of association; 
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- a resolution of the members; such a resolution must, in the absence of anything 
appearing to the contrary in the articles of association, be supported by a majority 
embracing at least three-fourths of the votes given; 
- an adjudication of bankruptcy. 
 In addition to the above-mentioned situations, a company can be dissolved by 
an order of the court in the case that the object for which it was formed becomes 
unattainable or in the presence of other substantial grounds (Wichtige Grund) connected 
with the affairs of the company176. In these cases, the action demanding dissolution must 
be brought against the company. Moreover, it can only be brought by a certain number of 
members, the aggregate amount of whose shares represent at least a tenth of the capital177.  
 In general, the position regarding dissolution is different in Ukraine and 
Germany. The most important distinction is that the German law provides the possibility 
for minority shareholders to bring a lawsuit in order to dissolve a company. 
 Clearly, as a remedy, dissolution should be employed only in the case of a 
deadlock, that is, in case that a company cannot continue to operate. If a company is able 
to operate, the court should award a remedy, such as withdrawal or expulsion. If a 
company is seen as a separate entity from its shareholders, and given the significance of a 
company as a component of the whole economy, all possible efforts must be made to 
save it. Dissolution, as a remedy, should be employed rarely and only in extraordinary 
                                                 





situations. It is better to operate without one, two or even thousands of shareholders, than 
to completely dissolve a company. 
3.3.6 Derivative Action (Suit) and Direct Action 
The separation of a legal entity from its shareholders is the main rule of corporate 
law. Because of this, the general rule is that only a company can be a complainant 
regarding its business affairs. In other words, a director, as a representative of a company, 
can bring a lawsuit on behalf and in the name of a company. Neither majority nor 
minority shareholders can make an action to protect the interests of a company. However, 
it is common that management, using its power, may not act in the best interest of the 
corporation. In this situation, it is unlikely that a director will bring a lawsuit against 
him/herself.  
The common law developed several exceptions to this rule so that individuals could 
sue by themselves, or on behalf of a company (derivative action). The following situations 
allow for exceptions to the rule, to allow a shareholder to bring an action: 
- if directors or officers act in an “ultra vires” manner;178  
- if directors or officers holding the majority of shares use their shares to approve  
fraud or breach of fiduciary duty committed against the company by themselves 
or their associates;179 
                                                 




-  “if the directors or officers infringe on an individual right of the 
complainant”;180 
- If the decision requires a special resolution rather than an ordinary one.181 
Although the derivative action is widely recognized in common law countries, it 
is not so recognized in civil law countries, such as Ukraine and Germany. 
 Modern Ukrainian corporate law is not familiar with the concept of a derivative 
suit. Its emergence there is closely related to historical developments when the idea of the 
impossibility of combining the interests of the corporation with the interests of its 
shareholders was supported by scholars in the USSR. Thus, today the situation regarding 
derivative action has begun to change. One famous Ukrainian scholar, O. Vinnik, in both 
her book182 and her article,183 suggests that a derivative suit is a necessary protective 
mechanism of the rights that belong to shareholders of business associations184. Moreover, 
if Ukraine wants to be a part of the European community, it has to adopt some EU 
directives, including directives on this issue. 
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Nowadays, in Ukraine, a shareholder can bring a lawsuit on his behalf, rather than 
on behalf of a company, in the following cases: According to the Recommendation of the 
Supreme Commercial Court, corporate disputes also include disputes brought by 
shareholders regarding the invalidation of a contract signed by a company; in this case a 
plaintiff will justify his/her claim by the breaching of his right and interest185. In addition 
to this, Article 12 (4) of the Commercial Procedural Code of Ukraine186 foresees that a 
party to a corporate dispute can also be a former shareholder. Thus, disputes regarding 
the invalidation of a resolution on a question concerning the expulsion of a former 
shareholder, and disputes in regard to the collection of a company debt in the case of 
withdrawal, if a company has not paid the required amount of money at all, or has paid 
only in part, can be also brought by the shareholders.187 
It follows that in Ukraine a shareholder can bring a lawsuit when his/her own 
rights as a shareholder have been breached. The action cannot be brought on behalf of a 
company, and the shareholder must cover all expenses personally. In the situation that a 
director does not act in the best interest of a company, causing the dissatisfaction of the 
majority shareholders, the majority is able to pass a resolution to compel a director to 
bring a lawsuit on behalf of the corporation. According to Ukrainian law, such a 
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resolution must be passed in a general meeting, and it binds everyone in the company: 
shareholders, employees, and management (if different from employees).  
If a director does not comply with this resolution, shareholders have several 
options. The first is to convene a new meeting, change the director, and compel the new 
director to bring a lawsuit against the former director on the grounds of failure to 
implement the resolution. In this case, the lawsuit is certain to succeed, but it is hard to 
determine the losses of the company. In addition to this, it is necessary to remember that 
as a general rule, the director’s liability cannot exceed his one-month salary. The better 
option is for shareholders to prove a director’s self-enrichment through kickbacks or 
bribes, or show that he has exceeded his authority, and then bring an application to open a 
criminal case188. If such a case were opened, as a part of a criminal procedure it would be 
possible to bring a civil lawsuit too in Ukraine. If someone brings a civil lawsuit as a part 
of the criminal process, in this situation a person has unlimited responsiblility. In other 
words, the general rule of labor law (liability cannot exceed one-month salary) does not 
apply in this situation. The third option is only theoretical and is not contemplated in any 
of the literature reviewed for this thesis. It is also not found in doctrine nor in judicial 
practice. Nevertheless, the approach is derived from the understanding of a company. As 
we know, shareholders constitute a company, and they form its organs. Therefore, it can 
be assumed that the power of the board of directors is derived from the shareholders. 
Shareholders, in that case, are synonymous with a “shareholder’s meeting”, which is the 
                                                 




highest body in a company.  Thus, the power of directors is the power delegated from the 
shareholder’s meeting. In a very simple sense, this is similar to the practice of giving 
power of attorney to someone. Thus, if a director does not want to bring a lawsuit on 
behalf of the company, the shareholders, by passing the resolution, can do it. Though it is 
very simple, it does not work in Ukraine, because there only a director is a representative 
of a company, not shareholders.  
Therefore, in Ukraine, only the majority can, theoretically, induce a company to 
bring a lawsuit against management. In the situation that a director is an “executor” of the 
majority’s will, the minority shareholder’s rights can be abused without the possibility of 
bringing an action on behalf of a company; in other words, minority shareholders cannot 
protect their interest by using this remedy. It is clear that Ukrainian law has to change this 
approach. 
This remedy is more fully developed in Germany than in Ukraine. The German 
GmbH is also a separate legal entity. This means individual shareholders’ rights of 
enforcement against a GmbH’s organs are prohibited. In other words, German law does 
not give the right to an individual shareholder to compel the company’s organs to act in 
accordance with their duties189. 
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Another question is whether shareholders can bring an action on behalf of the 
corporation for harm caused by the organs of the corporation, which are management or 
other shareholders, if they have violated their duties towards a company190. The answer to 
this question relates to the fact that a director is an agent of a company, and agency 
relations create fiduciary duties. In Germany these duties consist of two elements: the 
duty of care and the duty of loyalty.  
The duty of care is explicitly outlined in Article 43 of the Private Limited 
Companies Act191, which says that the managers must apply the diligence of careful 
businessmen to the conduct of the business. German law has interpreted the duty of care 
through the so-called business judgment rule, which is a traditional approach in common 
law countries, especially the US and Canada. However, in Germany, the business 
judgment rule is interpreted differently than in common law countries, with the purpose 
“not to discourage the risk-taking and entrepreneurial activity of the directors”192.    
The duty of loyalty is not established under the Law on GmbH; however, it has 
been developed and recognized by the courts 193 . “In contrast to the German Stock 
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Companies, the relationships between shareholders and managers of GmbH are 
characterized by the great degree of co-operation and personal trust”194. 
Not only do the directors of a company owe the duty of loyalty, majority 
shareholders also owe it. This is confirmed by the opinion of the German Federal 
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof): “The possibility for the majority of shareholders to 
exercise influence on the management and, therefore, to interfere with the business 
interests of the other shareholders requires as a counterpart the legal obligation to 
consider these interests”195. Moreover, in Germany, each shareholder owes a certain duty 
of loyalty both to the company and to other shareholders. 
In the GmbH, the shareholder’s right to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the 
corporation (actio pro societate) is stipulated under certain conditions. According to 
Article 46 (8) of The Private Limited Companies Act196 shareholders, in the general 
meeting, can decide whether to bring an action against directors or shareholders for 
damage that they did to the company or not. Of course, this resolution can only be passed 
by the majority. However, as mentioned earlier, the majority owe a duty of loyalty and, 
thus, an individual shareholder may bring a lawsuit only in the case that the majority 
decline to pass a resolution regarding bringing an action against shareholders or a director, 
thereby breaching the fiduciary duty. 
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Thus, in German law, there is no statutory basis for derivative suits in a GmbH, 
although the possibility is generally recognized by scholars, and, most importantly, by 
courts. However, in Germany, as well as in Ukraine, many scholars consider that the 
shareholders’ option to bring a lawsuit against directors who act dishonestly is nearly 
impossible to act upon197.   As a result, a lawsuit against a director for bearing a liability 
has always been rare in Germany198. Most common is a lawsuit brought by the company 
against management after a change of management, or by the bankruptcy trustee in the 
process of bankruptcy.  Therefore, German law devotes numerous statutory provisions to 
the regulation of related party transactions 199 ; however, it also gives an individual 
shareholder “almost no tools to enforce these provisions”200.  
It follows that direct action in civil law countries cannot, for the most part, protect 
majority shareholders, because it is hard to prove the breach of shareholders’ rights or 
directors’ duties. As for the derivative action, in Ukraine it is not recognized at all, and in 
Germany it is recognized but still hard to exercise and, thus, is almost useless. In 
Germany and Ukraine, it is hard to protect the minority’s interests because the “Majority 
Rule” is too strong.  
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3.3.7 Stakes Not Shares 
As mentioned earlier, in Ukraine, there are no shares in the Limited Liability 
Company. At first glance, it does not matter whether a shareholder has 1000 shares 
constituting 30 per cent of all stakes (votes), or has just 30 per cent of the stakes in a 
company. But in fact this difference does matter. The Law “On Securities and Stock 
Exchange” provides that, 
A share shall be a registered security that certifies the property rights of its 
owner (shareholder) that relate to the joint stock company, including the 
right to receive a portion of the profit of the joint stock company in the 
form of dividends, the right to receive a portion of the property of the joint 
stock company in case of its liquidation, the right to manage the joint 
stock company as well as non-property rights envisaged by the Civil Code 
of Ukraine and the law that regulates the establishment, operation and 
termination of joint stock companies.201  
Pursuant to Article 177,202 objects of civil rights shall be things, including money 
and securities, other property, ownership rights, results of work, services, the results of 
intellectual and creative activity, information, as well as other tangible and intangible 
welfare. This definition shows that securities, which include a share, constitute “things”. 
Thus, an item of the material world with respect to civil rights and obligations may arise 
and shall be recognized as a “thing”203.  
                                                 
201 Law “On Securities and Stock Exchange”, 23.02.2006 № 3480-IV, online: 
Official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (Parliament) 
<http://www.rada.gov.ua> , Article 6 [translated by author]. 
202 Civil Code of Ukraine, supra note 98, Article 177. 




Therefore, a share is a special kind of thing - an object of civil right. This means 
that a share may be freely alienated or transferred from one person to another under the 
procedure of succession or inheritance, or by other means204. In other words, a share is 
something similar to, for example, a house. One can sell it or grant it to someone and, 
most importantly, one’s heirs can and will inherit it. 
However, one problem with this exists at the theoretical level. Ukraine, like 
Russia, has changed the law regarding shares. Nowadays, it is not possible to issue a 
paper form of a share. The elimination of shares as documents raises a question regarding 
the presence of one element of ownership title – the title to possess. According to civil 
law, each “thing” (a share is a thing) must have an owner and be material. Ownership, in 
Roman law, means that the owner of a thing has the titles to possess, use and dispose of 
his property. Often, these three titles are called the “triad of ownership titles”. If there is a 
non-documentary share, what does a shareholder possess if there is no material (factual) 
“thing”, but only a juridical fiction205? For, materially, there is no share at all. Factually, 
an owner of non-documental shares is per se a nominal owner206. Acknowledgement of 
ownership of the rights (because he is a nominal owner), and not only of the “thing”, 
implies the truncation of the classical “triad of ownership titles” and, consequently, 
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changes the whole theory of Civil Law ownership. However, this question is out of the 
scope of this paper. 
Regarding a stake, the question of its nature is unintelligible. The legislatoion 
does not provide any definition of what a stake is or of its nature. Theoretically, using 
systematic analysis, we can come to an important conclusion. The Laws “On Joint Stock 
Companies” and “On Business Associations” as well as the Civil and Commercial codes, 
stipulate that shares and stakes grant to their owners property rights and non-property 
rights (receiving dividends, participation in the management of a corporation, receiving 
information and so on).  
Property rights, together with things, form the notion of property. This is 
confirmed by Article 190207: Property as a specific object shall be considered a separate 
thing or set of things, as well as property rights and obligations208. As noted a thing is an 
object of the material world, which is something that exists such that one can touch or 
hold it. A stake is obviously a “legal fiction”, thus it cannot be recognized as a thing. 
Consequently a stake is a combination of property and non-property rights, but it is not a 
thing. 
Accordingly, the legal status of stakes and shares are different. A share is a thing, 
which gives its owner combinations of rights. A stake, in turn, is a combination of 
property and non-property rights, which is derived from membership in a business 
association. 
                                                 





These differences in the legal nature of shares and stakes cause problems. The 
first is a problem as to succession. Pursuant to Article 1219 of Civil Code of Ukraine, 
rights and obligations inseparably connected with the testator shall not be included in an 
inheritance, particularly the right to participate in a business association and the right to 
membership in associations of citizens, unless otherwise established by law or the 
constituent documents209. At first glance, this is a fitting provision. However, it is not so 
fitting. Even if constituent documents allow for the possibility of inheriting stakes, this 
provision is impossible to fulfill without a condition, and the biggest problem with this 
condition is majority shareholders. In contrast to a Joint Stock Company where anyone 
who has shares is granted some rights, in a Ukrainian Limited Liability Company, these 
rights are granted to one whose name appears in the articles. Thus, to elect a new member 
of a company, the general meeting must pass a resolution by which to modify the articles. 
Moreover, this resolution must be passed by the majority, with no less than 3/4 of the 
votes210. Hence, it is up to the majority whether or not to admit a new member.  
The second problem is associated with selling stakes. If a shareholder sells his 
stake, a new shareholder obtains the rights and the status of the old shareholder, again, 
only after changing the articles of association. Thus, it is impossible to sell a stake to a 
third party without the permission of the majority. In this situation, a buyer is not 
guaranteed to become a new shareholder of company. Evidently, even a court does not 
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have the power to force the shareholders’ vote on some question in the meeting. It is up 
to shareholders whether to vote or not and no one can force them to do this. 
There is a practice that solves the second problem. To protect the buyer of a stake, 
a shareholders’ resolution must be prepared under which the necessary number of 
shareholders vote for the inclusion of a new member in the articles of association and the 
withdrawal of a previous member, who is the seller. This resolution must be fully 
prepared (with all appropriate signatures and stamps, but without a date). The seller then 
takes this resolution and goes with the buyer to a notary. In exchange for money, the 
seller gives this resolution to the buyer and a notary certifies and dates the resolution. The 
buyer, with the “rightful” document, goes to the Registrar’s office and the officer changes 
the articles of association by changing the names of shareholders, based on the resolution.  
The second possibility for the secure sale of a stake is the way according to which 
a seller, in exchange for money, gives a power of attorney to a buyer’s authorized 
representative (trustee) with the right to vote in the general meeting. This authorized 
representative votes to include the buyer in the shareholders’ list of the articles of 
association and to withdraw a former shareholder (the seller). The second variant is 
permissible but undesirable on account of the many risks that a buyer bears. First of all, 
the majority must vote on the decision. If a seller has a majority of the votes (3/4), there 
is no problem. But the biggest risk relates to the nature of a power of attorney. It is 
common knowledge that a principal can, at any moment, revoke the power of attorney, 
and this can be a ground for the invalidation of the meeting. In the second option, then, a 




Concerning a share, on the other hand, everything is much easier. One party, 
based on the shares’ sale agreement, sells, and the other party buys shares. Then a buyer 
takes this contract and goes to the Registrar’s Office.  Based on this agreement (not on 
the resolution of the general meeting, as it is in an LLC), the Registrar’s officer changes 
the name of the owner of shares. For shares, there is no need for shareholder approval. 
Thus, a sale agreement is the only action needed to transfer the shares.  
It is true that in the common law world, a privately-owned company’s documents 
usually stipulate the prohibition of selling shares without the consent of other 
shareholders or the impossibility of the inheritance of shares by heirs. However, it is 
important to note that these prohibitions are stipulated in the shareholders agreement or 
articles of association, and everyone who signs these documents agrees to pursue them. 
The situation is totally different in Ukraine. The default rules are that the shares can be 
freely transferred (sold, granted) to any person, and that the heirs do not inherit them. 
Even if all shareholders agreed, for example, that shares can be inherited, this agreement 
will not have any legal strength or power and cannot be performed. Moreover, as 
mentioned, the default rule is that shares can be freely transferred to any person, but in 
practice this is not the case, because at any time, the majority can block this operation. 
Even if the constitutional documents of a company stipulate that any shareholder can sell 
his/her shares without the consent of other shareholders, again, this provision will not 
work. Thus, in Ukraine, statutes limit in some way the leeway shareholders may have. It 
is mainly due to the fact that, in this case, the law stipulates default rules which reflect the 




most cases, these rules fit, though there are people who are not satisfied with them. 
Especially for them, it is necessary to provide the possibility of changing the default rules, 
so long as the change does not contradict relevant statutes and common sense. 
Overall, company stakes cause many serious problems that need urgent solution. 
The Ukrainian legislator should pursue three possible avenues. First, it could cancel 
stakes and leave only shares. Second, it could recognize a stake as a special non-material 
thing or give some special status to it and define its nature. Third, it could allow the 
creation of a unanimous shareholder’s agreement granting the power to change some 
rules and procedures within a company, as in common law countries like Canada.211 
3.4 Shareholder Protection under Civil Law: A Summary of Problems 
  The preceding discussion set out possible shareholder remedies and their 
associated problems, especially for minority shareholders, and the ways that the majority 
can abuse the minority by exploiting their position. It also suggested that minority 
shareholder protection in Civil Law countries, based on German and Ukrainian law, 
provide some possible ways of protecting the minority’s rights and interests, although, 
not satisfactorily enough.  
 In Civil Law countries, the articles of association almost fully define the leeway 
and the rights of the minority. The articles of association are, however, approved by the 
majority. Thus, of course, in many situations they reflect the will of the majority. As such, 
                                                 




it is likely that the articles of association will not provide favorable options for minority 
protection, such as by cumulative voting, passing resolutions by the greater number of 
votes, selling shares to third parties, and enforcement of the obligations of the majority 
for the benefit of the minority.  
 Many rights outlined in statutes can be limited or even eliminated by the articles 
of association. Again, this works against the minority. The withdrawal remedy is a 
powerful weapon in the minority’s arsenal, but sometimes it cannot be used because of 
the need to prove some extraordinary circumstances. In some cases, it is an extreme 
remedy, because its use ends the relationship between a shareholder and a company. In 
many situations, the minority wants to be a part of a company and so does not want to use 
this remedy. Moreover, it is almost impossible to determine or receive a fair price for 
shares, as this depends on the concurrence of the majority shareholders. 
 The expulsion remedy can be a good way to exclude a shareholder that does not 
act in the best interests of a company. However, some jurisdictions do not provide the 
opportunity to implement this remedy for the minority (Ukraine), while others, such as 
Germany, stipulate this possibility for the minority, who may not, however, be able to 
take advantage of it due to the financial costs associated with doing so. 
Direct action may protect the interests of a shareholder and a company itself. 
However, because of the compulsory requirement to bring a lawsuit to show the breach 




 Derivative action and fiduciary duties are not stipulated at all in civil law 
countries, such as Ukraine; or they are not well-developed, such as in Germany. These 
institutions need to be adequately developed to protect both majority and minority 
shareholders. 
 There are some problems in Civil Law countries regarding shareholder protection 
that cannot be resolved for the benefit of the minority. Some of these are: 
- If the majority does not pay dividends, but instead, increases their salary and fires 
the minority from a director position: For instance, if there are 3 directors, and 
one owns 50 per cent of the shares, and the other two own 25 per cent each, the 
director who is the majority, can, at the meeting, pass a resolution according to 
which he/she remains the only director, and can distribute all the profit not as 
dividends, but as bonus, on top of his/her salary as a director. In this case, the 
minority does not have the right to bring a lawsuit because their rights as 
shareholders are not breached.  Furthermore, they retain all rights and obligations 
as shareholders. 
- A majority shareholder employs his/her relatives or trusted persons as counselors 
with huge salaries: These appointees, legally, do nothing but give back some 
money to the director as a kickback. It works in this way: a director hires, for 
example, one counselor with the salary of 10 000 $ per month. Each month, this 
“counselor” pays back to this director (the majority) 9 000 $. This means that the 
real salary of the director is his nominal salary plus 9 000 $. Again the minority 




- The majority can use the expulsion right against the minority, which will 
eventually lead to the exclusion of the minority from a company on some 
“formal” grounds.  
- Because of the “Majority Rule”, a minority, de facto, does not participate in the 
election of the board of directors or supervisory boards. 
- If the majority or director(s) do not act in the best interest of a company, the 
minority cannot bring a lawsuit against them because the minority can bring an 
action only when their rights as shareholders are breached, but not the rights of a 
company. A company is a separate legal entity, which itself decides whether or 
not to sue.  
- Very common is a situation where the majority, in conjunction with the director 
(who may be the same person), sells valuable assets below value to another 
company, which is also controlled by the majority; or when the director sells the 
products of a company at a much lower price to another company, which is also 
controlled by the majority. Again, usually no law is breached in these situations. 
The biggest of the problems which are difficult to solve is that in a Civil Law 
system, a person can bring a lawsuit only if his/her rights are breached. Moreover, a 
court has less power than its counterpart in a Common Law system. In a Civil Law 
system, a court cannot interpret law and cannot go beyond the scope of the plaintiff’s 
claim; it can only award the remedy which is stipulated in the law. Thus, even if it is 
obvious that some action is unfair, and possibly detrimental to someone, but that 




some212 Civil Law countries a court does not have the power to award amendments to 
the constitutional documents of a company, which do not serve the interests of the 
minority. Thus, a civil law system needs some additional forms of statutory or 
judicial intervention to facilitate solutions to these problems, which at the moment, 
cannot be solved in the interest of the minority. 
Corporate law develops very fast. Because of this, it is impossible to foresee 
every possible breach of the law. This is why the Civil Law system must import some 
remedies from Common Law countries, or contrive some unique ones, which may be 
too broad but theoretically usable in many situations. 
The next Chapter draws on Canadian law to examine possible options to increase 
minority shareholder protection and to offer some solutions to the above-mentioned 
problems. 
                                                 





THE SOLUTION: SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION IN THE COMMON 
LAW SYSTEM 
4.1 Introduction 
This Chapter suggests possible solutions regarding the protection of minority 
shareholders against the majority and directors. The solutions suggested here are part of 
the regimes of corporate law in common law jurisdictions, such as Canada, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. All of these countries provide many more 
tools to protect minority shareholders than continental countries do. Moreover, these are 
the leading common law countries, and so, the solutions reflect their experiences and 
knowledge in protecting minority shareholders and a company itself. 
The discussion focuses on the principal means of shareholder protection in the 
common law, namely: directors’ duties; the oppression remedy; and derivative actions. 
The common law jurisdictions developed these remedies over many years provide for 
wide discretion in the effort to protect the minority. There are many common law 
countries in the world, and it is impossible to examine them all, hence these remedies are 
considered mainly from a Canadian perspective, but also with reference to the United 
States and England. The argument advanced is that by using these remedies, minority 




The remedies do not make it directly possible for minority shareholders to enjoy 
real participation in the management of a company. A real participation can only be 
achieved in the case when the minority is able to elect at least one director of the Board. 
Thus, this section, in addition to above-mentioned remedies, examines cumulative voting 
as a means for the minority to elect directors. 
 
4.2 Director Duties 
As outlined in the previous chapters, some civil law countries, such as Ukraine 
and Russia, do not impose any special duties on a director, except that he/she must act in 
accordance with the articles of association and laws - in other words, a duty of obedience 
or ultra vires doctrine. In principle, this is the only special duty imposed on directors. 
Other countries, such as Germany, provide the duty of care213 and the duty of loyalty. 
Although, the duty of loyalty is not established under the Law on GmbH in Germany, it 
has been developed and recognized by courts214. Nonetheless, because of the general 
principle of civil law regarding liability, which provides an obligation to prove a 
director’s guilt, damage, and the relationship between the guilt and damage, it is not easy 
to find a director liable for breach of his/her duties. Moreover, even if a director in a civil 
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law country exercises his/her power without the “diligence of careful business men,”215 
without being “a reasonably prudent person”216 or a “reasonably diligent person,”217 so 
long as that director’s imprudence is unintentional, without guilt, it creates an exception 
as to his/her liability. Clearly, the duty of care and loyalty, even if it exists, is still not 
adequately developed in civil law countries, compared to duties of directors in the 
common law world.  
Thus, directors’ duties have to be expanded in civil law countries, as they are in 
common law countries. As we know, a director plays a very important role in a company. 
He/she can serve not only in the best interest of a company, but also in his/her own 
interest. He/she can act selectively in the interest of only some constituencies, such as 
majority shareholders, leading to the oppression of the minority. In other words, a 
director can be a means of protection for minority shareholders and the company, but also 
the biggest means of abuse and neglect of their rights. However, if a director knows that 
he/she must act not only in the best interest of the majority shareholder, but also in the 
interest of the minority, and that he/she will be held responsible if he/she does not do this, 
it is more likely that a director will not abuse minority’s rights. In view of these 
considerations, it is necessary for civil law jurisdictions to borrow from the duty of care 
and fiduciary duties that common law countries apply to corporate management. 
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In Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, these duties developed for 
many years, and are now widely used to inform both the theory and practice of corporate 
governance. The duties have, so far, been developed and defined mainly by the judiciary 
thorough court decisions. 
Professor Sarah Bradley observes that: “The duties owed by directors generally 
fall within three broad categories. The first is the duty of obedience, or the duty to act 
within one’s powers, in compliance with the [laws] and the constitutive documents of the 
company.”218 This duty is well elaborated in both common law countries and civil law 
countries. It constitutes the ultra vires standard. Because of the existence of the duty of 
obedience in both law systems, this thesis does not consider it in this Chapter. “The 
second is the duty to act with reasonable care, without negligence; and the third is to act 
with the loyalty of a fiduciary, to be trustworthy and act in good faith.”219 
4.2.1 Duty of Care 
The second duty is the duty of care, diligence and skill, which usually refers to a 
duty of care. The common law duty of care imposes on directors an obligation to fulfill 
their work in accordance with prescribed standards to the requisite degree of care and 
skill.220 This duty has been developed mainly by the judiciary, but currently it can be 
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found in many common law statutes, such as the CBCA221 and the UK Companies Act.222 
In the CBCA, for example, this duty is stated to the effect that every director and officer 
of a corporation, in exercising their powers and discharging their duties, shall exercise the 
care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable 
circumstances.223 The statute does not specify who the reasonable person is and what the 
comparable circumstances are. However, case law has evolved several standards to guide 
and inform the actions of directors. 
The leading case regarding the duty of care, Re City Equitable Fire Insurance 
Company Limited,224 explains the duty of care. In this case Romer J. said: 
A director need not exhibit in the performance of his duties a greater 
degree of skill than may reasonably be expected from a person of his 
knowledge and experience. A director of a life insurance company, for 
instance, does not guarantee that he has the skill of an actuary or of a 
physician. In the words of Lindley M.R.: "If directors act within their 
powers, if they act with such care as is reasonably to be expected from 
them, having regard to their knowledge and experience, and if they act 
honestly for the benefit of the company they represent, they discharge both 
their equitable as well as their legal duty to the company."225 It is perhaps 
                                                 
221 CBCA, supra note 8, s 122. 
222 UK Companies Act, supra note 217, s 174. 
223 CBCA, supra note 8, s 122 (b). 
224 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Company Limited, [1925] Ch 407, [1924] All 
ER REP 485. 




only another way of stating the same proposition to say that directors are 
not liable for mere errors of judgment.226 
Judge Romer continued by observing that a director is not bound to give 
continuous attention to the affairs of his company: “His duties are of an intermittent 
nature to be performed at periodical board meetings, and at meetings of any committee of 
the board upon which he happens to be placed. He is not, however, bound to attend all 
such meetings, though he ought to attend whenever, in the circumstances, he is 
reasonably able to do so.”227 He also observed that, “having regard to the exigencies of 
business, and the articles of association, [some duties] may properly be left to some other 
official, … [and] in the absence of grounds for suspicion, [a director is] justified in 
trusting that official to perform such duties honestly.”228 
Moreover, it is important to mention that the law in Canada and the US has the 
common requirements that the court must be satisfied that the directors have acted 
reasonably and fairly. The court looks to see that the directors have made reasonable 
decisions, not perfect decisions.229 In other words, perfection is not demanded. 
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In contrast to the subjective standard, “based upon the care and skill which a 
particular director would reasonably be expected to exercise in light of his/her personals 
skills and training,”230 the modern common law standard now also includes objective 
elements. Confirmation of the above-mentioned test can be found in the recent case 
Equitable Life Insurance Society v. Bowley
231, where the court pointed out that a director 
should exercise his/her power as a “reasonably diligent person having both … the general 
knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected [in comparable 
situations] … and the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has.”232 
The widening of the standard of the duty of care has been in response to practical 
exigencies. McGuinness observes that, "given the history of the case law in this area 
[duty of care], and the prevailing standards of competence displayed in commerce 
generally, it is quite clear that directors were not expected at common law to have any 
particular business skill or judgment.”233 Moreover, in the 1971 report entitled Proposals 
for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada (hereafter the Dickerson Report),234 
the committee came to the same conclusion and gave some objective recommendations 
regarding the existing standard of duty of care: 
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Recent experience 235  has demonstrated how low the prevailing legal 
standard of care for directors is, and we have sought to raise it 
significantly. We are aware of the argument that raising the standard of 
conduct for directors may deter people from accepting directorships. The 
truth of that argument has not been demonstrated and we think it is 
specious. The duty of care imposed by s. 9.19(1)(b) is exactly the same as 
that which the common law imposes on every professional person, for 
example, and there is no evidence that this has dried up the supply of 
lawyers, accountants, architects, surgeons or anyone else. It is in any event 
cold comfort to a shareholder to know that there is a steady supply of 
marginally competent people available under present law to manage his 
investment.”236 
 
Taking into consideration the opinions of the committee and scholars, legislators 
and courts raised the standard of the duty of care. Moreover, to the statutory duty of care 
was added “in comparable circumstances,” which is intended to make “relevant all of the 
circumstances in which a decision is made, including the qualifications of the particular 
director, the significance of the action to the director when making the decision, the time 
available for making the decision, the alternatives open to the corporation, and other 
factors.” 237  It might also be used to apply different standards to different directors 
depending on whether the director is an “outside” or an “inside” director, a representative 
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of a special interest group such as workers or minority shareholders, or a professional 
advisor to the corporation, such as a lawyer or an accountant. 
 The Supreme Court of Canada recently summarized the duty of care as follows: 
The contextual approach dictated by s.122(1)(b) of the CBCA not only 
emphasizes the primary facts but also permits prevailing socio-economic 
conditions to be taken into consideration. The emergence of stricter 
standards puts pressure on corporations to improve the quality of board 
decisions. The establishment of good corporate governance rules should 
be a shield that protects directors from allegations that they have breached 
their duty of care. However, even with good corporate governance rules, 
directors' decisions can still be open to criticism from outsiders. Canadian 
courts, like their counterparts in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Australia and New Zealand, have tended to take an approach with respect 
to the enforcement of the duty of care that respects the fact that directors 
and officers often have business expertise that courts do not. Many 
decisions made in the course of business, although ultimately unsuccessful, 
are reasonable and defensible at the time they are made. Business 
decisions must sometimes be made, with high stakes and under 
considerable time pressure, in circumstances in which detailed information 
is not available. It might be tempting for some to see unsuccessful 
business decisions as unreasonable or imprudent in light of information 
that becomes available ex post facto. Because of this risk of hindsight bias, 
Canadian courts have developed a rule of deference to business decisions 
called the "business judgment rule," adopting the American name for the 
rule.”238  
 
Therefore, in assessing whether or not the directors or officers have met their 
obligations, Canadian courts generally approach the subject on the basis of what has 
become known as the “business judgment rule.” This rule operates to shield from court 
intervention business decisions that have been made honestly, prudently, in good faith 
and on reasonable grounds. Specifically, the court will look to see that the directors or 
                                                 




officers have made a reasonable decision, not necessarily a perfect decision.239 Directors 
and officers are not likely to be held to be in breach of their duty of care if they have 
acted prudently and on a reasonably informed basis in light of all the circumstances, 
including the prevailing socio-economic conditions, about which they knew or ought to 
have known. 
To sum up, this duty forces a director to perform his/her duties with care, 
diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise. The judicial standard 
requires that a director must make reasonable decisions, not perfects ones. Business 
decisions sometimes are made with high stakes and under considerable time pressure, and 
so it is possible to make a wrong decision. However, when a director acts honestly but 
makes a mistake, the courts protect the director, by resort to the “business judgment rule”. 
Thus, if a director acts within his/her power, if he/she acts with such care as is reasonably 
to be expected from him/her, having regard to his/her knowledge and experience and 
taking into consideration the circumstances in which the decisions are made, and if he/she 
acts honestly for the benefit of a company, it is unlikely that he/she will be liable for the 
relevant actions. 
 
                                                 




4.2.2 Fiduciary Duties 
In addition to their statutory duty of care and the duty of obedience, in the 
common law, directors owe the fiduciary duty, which can be described as a duty of 
loyalty and good faith. The conception of fiduciary duties is intended to protect a 
corporation against self-dealing, self-interest and bad faith at the hands of its directors or 
officers. These duties are also codified in many jurisdictions.240 The statutes are very 
broad and vague on this subject, so the duties have been mainly developed by the 
judiciary. For example, the fiduciary rule under the CBCA says that directors and officers, 
in exercising their powers and discharging their duties, shall act honestly and in good 
faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation241.  
In general, “the fiduciary duties of directors can be divided into three main 
categories: the duty to act in the best interests of the corporation, the duty of loyalty and 
to avoid conflicts of interest, and the duty to disclose any interests in corporate 
transactions.”242  
The first element of the fiduciary duty is acting in the best interest of the 
corporation. The notion of what is the interest of the corporation was considered in detail 
in the Chapter two. Article 122 of CBCA implies that the CBCA gives wide discretion to 
the court to decide what the best interests of the corporation are at any time. The 
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Dickerson Committee did not explain what the best interest of the corporation is because 
they wanted to “leave the law to develop in the hands of the judges.”243 This means that 
the whole matter of deciding whose interest is to be taken into consideration when 
deciding the best interest of the corporation is left to the court.  Apparently, the 
Dickerson Committee assumed that it will be easier for the courts to decide this matter. 
They never mentioned that this might involve the courts dealing with the business 
judgment rule, and that this discretion might be a burden on the courts’ shoulders.244 The 
reason behind leaving this issue to the court, as mentioned previously, is that the 
Committee wanted to avoid any radical changes, and rather, to let the courts make any 
changes that they think would fit with the Canadian system. It is noteworthy, for instance, 
that the Alberta Business Corporation Act,245 the most recent, totally reviewed provincial 
legislation on the subject in Canada, agrees with and cites the CBCA to say that this 
matter should be left in the hand of the courts to develop246.  
The courts have established rules that a director will be liable as a fiduciary if 
he/she fails to act in good faith and in what he/she honestly believes to be the best 
interests of the corporation when carrying out his/her statutory duty of managing the 
corporation. Traditionally, the courts had a fairly narrow view of what is in the best 
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interest of the corporation. They took the position that a director must always be 
governed by the profit motive for shareholders247 (“shareholder primacy” conception), 
and is prohibited from taking into account the interests of employees, creditors, 
consumers, or society-at-large, unless it can be established that actions taken or payments 
made for non-business purposes would increase profitability. Moreover, a director is 
expected to pursue the profit motive for the equal benefit of all shareholders. Any other 
actions that may negatively influence shareholders wealth maximization are inadmissible, 
and may lead to breaches of the director’s fiduciary duties.   
More recently, however, courts have started to adhere to positions that deviate 
from shareholder profit maximization. For example, in Pente Investment Management 
Ltd. v. Schneider Corp,
248
 the committee accepted a bid from Smithfield Foods that was 
higher than market value of the shares of the company, but less than another bid which 
was made by Maple Leaf Foods Inc. The main issue of this case was whether the 
committee’s actions were in the best interest of Schneider Corp or not. If not, the officers 
and directors of the corporation did not act in good faith. The Ontario Court of Appeal 
dismissed the action by Maple Leaf Foods, because after analyzing all the circumstances 
of the committee, the court came to the conclusion that the committee acted in the best 
interests of the company. It obtained fair value for the shareholders given the “intense 
time-limit-driven context”249 of the bid process. 
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In a more recent case, Peoples Department Stores (Trustee of) v. Wise,250 the court 
gave an explanation regarding the issue of the best interests of the corporation: 
It is clear that the phrase the "best interests of the corporation" should be 
read not simply as the "best interests of the shareholders." From an 
economic perspective, the "best interests of the corporation" means the 
maximization of the value of the corporation ... We accept as an accurate 
statement of law that in determining whether they are acting with a view 
to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the 
circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, inter 
alia, the interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, 
consumers, governments and the environment.251  
 
A similar position regarding the “best interests of the corporation” was expressed 
the case of BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders,252: “in considering what is in the best 
interests of the corporation, directors may look to the interests of, inter alia, shareholders, 
employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment to inform their 
decisions”253. Moreover, the Supreme Court several times in this case referred to the 
fiduciary duty of a director “to act in the best interest of the corporation viewed as a good 
corporate citizen.”254 It would seem that by this, the Supreme Court of Canada broadened 
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the scope of fiduciary duties, adding a new standard for assessing whether or not the 
fiduciary duty has been properly carried out255. 
 Whether the court supports the wealth maximization position, or that according to 
which a director should act in the best interest of all constituencies of a corporation, it is a 
fact that the interest of shareholders must be taken into consideration for the interests of 
both majority and minority shareholders. 
Another element of the fiduciary duties of directors and officers is loyalty in the 
face of conflicts of interests. This duty includes many components, which were neatly 
summarized in the leading English case of Bristol and West Society v. Mothew256 by 
Millet L. J., who stated that it imposes on a director the duty to257:  
Act in good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must not 
place himself in a position where his duty and his interest may conflict; he 
may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of a third person without the 
informed consent of his principal. This is not intended to be an exhaustive 
list, but it is sufficient to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations. They 
are the defining characteristics of the fiduciary258. 
As can be seen, a director shall act in good faith and combine his/her own 
interests with the interests of the company he/she is working for. A director must also 
combine his/her interests in a way that is the best for the company. As fiduciaries, 
                                                 
255 Sarah Bradley, BCE Inc, supra note 31 at 344-47. 
256 Bristol and West Building Society v Mothew, [1996] 4 All ER 698. 
257 Sarah Bradley, supra note 119 at 53. 




directors are under a duty to avoid any conflict between self-interest and the interest of 
the corporation.  
Robert Milnes and Kathleen Richie observe that, “although recent legislation has 
developed statutory rules to regulate the director’s duty to disclose his interest in a 
corporate transaction and to regulate his use of confidential information in insider trading, 
other breaches are generally left to be governed by the common law and each case must 
be considered on its particular facts” 259 . In Peso Silver Mines, 260  for example, the 
Supreme Court of Canada held that the directors of the company were free to take up 
independently an opportunity originally offered to their corporation, but which had been 
rejected by the Board of directors in good faith on the basis that the corporation did not 
have sufficient funds to take up the opportunity. In finding for the directors, the court 
held there was insufficient evidence to show that the offer to the corporation “was 
accompanied by any confidential information unavailable to any prospective purchasers 
or that the directors had access to any such confidential information by reason of their 
office”261.  
 The position in Peso Silver Mines was changed in the leading Canadian case of 
Canadian Aero Services Ltd. v. O’Malley.
262 There the Supreme Court of Canada held 
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that former senior officers of a corporation were liable to the corporation when the 
officers deliberately set out to take advantage of a contract, the basis of which they had 
formerly developed as officers of the corporation. Justice Laskin held that senior officers 
have the same fiduciary duty to the corporation as its directors. This decision is important 
for several reasons. First, it is clear that each case must be considered in its own context 
and cannot be blindly conflated with other cases. Second, the principle from Peso Silver 
Mines that the directors of a corporation are always entitled to take advantage personally 
of opportunities formerly offered to their corporation, which were turned down for valid 
business reasons, was rejected. Finally, Justice Laskin made it clear that the fiduciary 
duties “extend past the time of employment.”263 
Generally, the duty of loyalty and the duty to avoid conflicts of interest is hard to 
define, and each case has to be considered on its own facts. Nonetheless, it is clear that 
the directors and officers of a corporation are entitled to take advantage of business 
opportunities that have been formerly offered to their corporation but were turned down 
for valid business reasons after full and fair disclosure. But directors who intentionally 
misappropriate corporate opportunities for their own gain, and not for the corporation, 
will be liable to the corporation, even if the gain materializes after they have ceased to be 
directors. 
                                                 




Both the CBCA264  and common law dealing with conflict of interest require 
directors and officers to disclose their interests in contracts and transactions. If a director 
or officer of a corporation fails to make the required disclosure, a court, on application by 
the corporation or any of its shareholders, may set aside the contract or transaction on any 
terms that it thinks fit, or require the director or officer to account to the corporation for 
any profit or gain realized on it, or do both of those things.265  
Since the 19th  century, the courts have been strict about the rule that a contract of 
a corporation in which one of its directors had a personal interest, whether pecuniary or 
non-pecuniary, is “voidable at the option of the company, so that the company has a 
choice whether to affirm or avoid the contract, but the contract must be either totally 
affirmed or totally avoided and the right of avoidance will be lost if such time elapses or 
such events occur as to prevent rescission of the contract”.266 Moreover, “the normal 
consequences which follow from a contract made by a person in such a fiduciary position 
is… [that] a director may be called on to account for profit which he has made out of the 
transaction”267. The only exception to this rule is when a director has fully declared 
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his/her interest in some contract or transaction and received approval from shareholders. 
In that case, this contract generally cannot be rendered voidable. 
These common law rules have had two main problems, which are now “removed” 
by modern statutes or amendments to existing ones. Firstly, it is common that when a 
director of a company is a controlling shareholder, he/she can escape liability by having 
the contract ratified by the shareholders’ meeting where he/she has appropriate numbers 
of votes. Secondly, due to the strictness of the common law rule, a contract which was 
fair and in the best interest of a company was, in reality, not protected from voidability. 
Realizing these problems, the Canadian legislator stipulated several provisions to 
solve the problems and to prevent a contract in which a director has interest from being 
voided. The CBCA tightened the disclosure requirements for directors and officers. 
Accordingly, a director or an officer of a corporation shall disclose to the corporation the 
nature and extent of any interest that he or she has in a material contract or material 
transaction, whether made or proposed, with the corporation268. As well, a director or 
officer must provide disclosure every time there is a material change in his/her interest 
regarding the transaction or contract.269 Furthermore, it is important to note that a director, 
who has interest in the contract or transaction, shall not vote on any resolution to approve 
this contract or transaction.270 
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The CBCA also provides that the contract or transaction is not automatically 
voidable only because of the presence of a director’s interest in the contract or 
transaction.271 Furthermore, the contract or transaction is not voidable if the interested 
director or officer was present or was counted to determine whether a quorum existed at 
the meeting of directors or committee of directors that considered the contract or 
transaction; if the interested director discloses his/her interest in accordance with the rules; 
the contract or transaction was approved by the board of directors or a shareholder 
meeting; and the contract or transaction was reasonable and fair to the corporation when 
it was approved or confirmed.272  The CBCA also provides for the situation when a 
director or officer does not disclose his/her interests and the transaction or contract was 
not reasonable and fair to the corporation. In this situation, a court may set aside the 
contract or transaction on any terms that it thinks fit, and require the director or officer to 
account for any profit and gain realized by him/her.273 
Canadian statutes do not define what “material interest” means. However, cases 
provide some clarification. Concerning the term “material,” the court in Exide Canada 
Inc. v. Hilts,274 setting aside the contract and ordering the CEO to account for profits, 
stated that “a material interest includes a personal relationship with the person who was a 
party to a material contract. Even where a director had no monetary interest in a person, 
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but the negotiation involves a close personal friend of one of the directors, the transaction 
ought to be suspect.”275  
Overall, the Canadian position regarding a director’s interests is elaborate and 
well-considered. It provides the counter balance between directors, shareholders and the 
corporation itself. On the one hand, a director has to disclose all the important 
information, but on the other hand, if under some circumstances he/she does not do this, 
it does not mean that the transaction or contract will always be voidable, and that the 
director will be liable for that. This fiduciary duty requires that a director and officer shall 
disclose any personal interest he/she may have in a material contract or transaction 
involving the corporation. Moreover, directors and officers who permit a corporation to 
be a party to a material contract or transaction in which the director or officer has an 
interest must ensure that the contract is reasonable and fair to the corporation. If a 
director or officer adheres to these obligations, “it is unlikely that they can later be called 
upon to account to the corporation for the profits from a transaction. More importantly, 
the corporation will be unable to exercise its common law option to void the contract”276. 
In summary, it can be said that the common law countries impose many more 
duties on directors and give them much more power than civil law countries do. 
Furthermore, the common law provides a good balance between the duties of directors 
and their liability, and also as to the relationship between directors and shareholders. 
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Essentially, therefore, in all situations, a director’s main duty is to act in the best interests 
of a corporation. That is why if a director is not satisfied with the action of the majority 
towards the minority or the company itself, he/she has the right not to implement the 
action or, more importantly, he/she can prevent its implementation. The director has an 
incentive to do so since if he/she carries out some action on the order of the majority 
shareholders, which action is not in the best interest of the corporation, or which 
oppresses the rights of some group, he/she will be personally liable for that action. Thus, 
a director in common law countries is a good means to balance the interests of the 
minority and majority shareholders of the company. In addition, a director in a common 
law country is disinterested in abusing the rights of shareholders because the costs for 
him/her may outweigh the benefits.  
Altogether, so long as directors exercise their powers in accordance with law and 
articles, with diligence, and do not hide important information from shareholders, they 
are unlikely to be liable for the consequences, even if the consequences are negative for 
the company. It can be said that the common law imposes on the director one broad duty 
– to try to do everything to promote the interest of corporation – and if a director does all 
that depends on him/her, he/she will not be liable for the actions even if the results are not 
favorable. Business involves risks, and the common law only stipulates that a director 
shall make reasonable decisions not perfect ones.277 Of course, a director, as a human 
being, will make mistakes. 
                                                 




In sum, it should be pointed out that by borrowing from the fiduciary duties and 
other duties imposed on directors in common law countries, civil law may solve many of 
the problems that currently plague their corporate regulatory regimes.  
4.3 Derivative Action 
The separation of a legal entity from its shareholders is the main principle of 
corporate law, explicitly expressed in the famous Foss v. Harbotlle case.278 Because of 
this feature, the general rule is that only a company can be a complainant regarding its 
business affairs. In other words, a director, as a representative of a company, can bring a 
lawsuit on behalf and in the name of a company. Neither majority nor minority 
shareholders can bring an action to protect the interests of a company. However, it is 
common that management, using its power, may not act in the best interests of the 
corporation. As such, it is unlikely that a director will bring a lawsuit against him/herself.  
Since Foss v. Harbottle, scholars and judges, have recognized that the general 
rule may raise problems where a director or managers own a controlling block of shares 
in the corporation. 279  Specific to this situation, the common law contrived several 
exceptions to this rule so that individuals could sue on behalf of a company. These 
exceptions thus allow derivative actions, enabling a shareholder to bring an action, for 
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example, if directors or officers act in an “ultra vires” manner;280 or if directors or officers 
holding the majority of shares use their shares to approve fraud or a breach of fiduciary duty 
committed against the company by themselves or their associates. 281  The Dickerson 
Committee pursued the same position282 when it indicated that the “typical examples of 
cases where a derivative action may be invoked are actions against directors or officers 
for a breach of duty under s. 9.19 [now s. 122 of the CBCA] alleging self-dealing or 
negligence, an action for an injunction to preclude a threatened injury to a corporation, or 
an action to restrain an act outside the scope of the authority of the corporation, its 
directors or officers.”283 
It is most important to keep in mind that the derivative action relates only to the 
enforcement of the rights of the corporation. “It is not available as a remedy to enforce 
the rights of an individual shareholder or even a group of shareholders, although a group 
of shareholders may bring, in representative form, a derivative action in the name of the 
corporation if they can characterize the issue as the enforcement of a right of the 
corporation.”284 
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Modern Ukrainian corporate law is not familiar with the concept of a derivative 
suit. As was mentioned in the previous Chapter, in Ukraine only the majority can, 
theoretically, induce a company to bring a lawsuit against management. In the situation 
that a director is an “executor” of the majority’s will, the minority shareholders’ rights 
can be abused, without the possibility that they can bring an action on behalf of the 
company. In other words, minority shareholders cannot protect their interest by using this 
remedy in Ukraine. 
In Germany, this remedy is more fully developed than in Ukraine. A German 
GmbH is also a separate legal entity. As such, it is prohibited for individual shareholders’ 
rights to be enforced against GmbH organs – that is, German law does not allow an 
individual shareholder to compel the company’s organs to act in accordance with their 
duties. In the GmbH, the shareholder right to bring a lawsuit on behalf of the corporation 
(actio pro societate) is stipulated under certain conditions. According to Article 46 (8) of 
the Private Limited Companies Act285 shareholders, in the meeting, can decide whether to 
bring an action against directors or shareholders for damage that they did to the company 
or not. The general rule is that this resolution can only be passed by the majority. But 
since, the majority owe a duty of loyalty, an individual shareholder may bring a lawsuit 
in the case that the majority refuse to pass a resolution regarding bringing an action 
against shareholders or a director, thereby breaching the fiduciary duty. 
                                                 




Obviously, in German law, there is no statutory basis for derivative suits 
regarding a GmbH, although the possibility is generally recognized by scholars, and, 
most importantly, by courts. However, in both Germany and Ukraine, many scholars 
consider that the shareholders’ option to bring a lawsuit against directors, who act 
dishonestly, is nearly impossible to act upon286. 
In the CBCA this remedy is stipulated in Article 239 under “commencing 
derivative action”. It is pointed out that the “statutory derivative action provisions replace 
the common law rules governing derivative actions, both as to availability of such relief 
and the procedure to be followed”287. In other words, the statutory derivative action 
provisions not only “expanded the availability of derivative action relief, compared to its 
availability in equity”,288 but also “introduced more precise procedural and substantive 
requirements that must be satisfied before such relief will become available”289. 
In the CBCA, the derivative action is foreseen in Section 239. It reads: “a 
complainant may apply to a court for leave to bring an action in the name and on behalf 
of a corporation or any of its subsidiaries, or intervene in an action to which any such 
body corporate is a party, for the purpose of prosecuting, defending or discontinuing the 
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action on behalf of the body corporate”290. Because a complainant in this remedy brings a 
lawsuit on behalf of a corporation, some scholars call it the “statutory representative 
action”291.  
Canadian law provides for the possibility to bring a derivative action for large 
numbers of stakeholders. Pursuant to Section 238, the notion of a “complainant” denotes 
a registered holder or beneficial owner, or a former registered holder or beneficial owner 
of the security of a corporation or any of its affiliates, a director, an officer or a former 
director or officer of a corporation or any of its affiliates, the Director, or any other 
person who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make an application under 
the remedy. It is clear that shareholders, whether they are majority or minority, are proper 
complainants and are able to bring a derivative action. 
Canadian law addresses how not to upset the balance of power between the 
minority and majority/directors. To prevent the minority from abusing (misusing) the 
right to bring a lawsuit, the CBCA specifies three conditions which shall precede the 
action. The first condition is to give notice to the directors of the corporation or its 
subsidiary of the complainant’s intention to apply to the court under Section 239 of the 
CBCA not less than fourteen days before bringing the application, or as otherwise 
ordered by the court, if the directors of the corporation or its subsidiary do not bring, 
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diligently prosecute, or defend or discontinue the action.292 This condition “reflects the 
concept of exhausting intra corporate remedies, with view to advocating the pursuit of a 
solution first within the corporation so as to economize judicial resources and to prevent a 
minority shareholder from abusing its right.”293 
The second condition foresees that the complainant has to act in good faith.294 The 
last, third condition, stipulates that the derivative action should be in the interests of the 
corporation or its subsidiary and that the action be brought, prosecuted, defended or 
discontinued.295 The last two conditions are interconnected and supplement each other. 
By the notion “to act in good faith”, Canadian law seeks to “preclude private 
vendetta”,296 and “by requiring the complainant to establish that the action is "prima facie 
in the interest of the corporation", it blocks actions to recover small amounts, particularly 
actions really instituted to harass or to embarrass directors or officers who have 
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committed an act which, although unwise, is not material.”297 This position has also been 
supported by the judiciary. For example, in Winfield v. Daniel,298 the court held that: 
Good faith is said to exist where there is prima facie evidence that the 
complainant is acting with proper motives such as reasonable belief in the 
merits of the claim. Good faith is a question of fact to be determined on 
the facts of each case. The typical approach by the Courts is not to attempt 
to define good faith but rather to analyze each set of facts for the existence 
of bad faith on the part of the applicant. If bad faith is found, then the 
requirement of good faith has not been met.299 
Concerning the last condition, the complainant has to make it clear to a court that 
the claim is in the interest of the company or its subsidiary, but not in his/her own 
interest.300 In other words, if, for instance, minority shareholders bring a lawsuit for their 
own interests and not for the corporation, they would not fulfill the third condition and, 
thus, the court must dismiss the application invoking the derivative action. It is also 
extremely important that the CBCA allows for complainants to show prima facie 
evidence that some action was not in the best interest of the corporation. This is 
significant in light of the minority shareholder’s weak position to provide information in 
support of their claim. 
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Analyzing the CBCA and court decisions, it is possible to come to the conclusion 
that these three conditions are compulsory. Thus, not showing even one of them will 
make it impossible to bring an action. Moreover, all three must be shown or proven by 
the complainant, which means that the complainant bears the burden of proof301.   
 Concerning a court’s power in connection with derivative action in Canada, the 
CBCA explicitly provides that “the court may at any time make any order it thinks fit 
including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, an order authorizing the 
complainant or any other person to control the conduct of the action; an order giving 
directions for the conduct of the action; an order directing that any amount adjudged 
payable by a defendant in the action shall be paid, in whole or in part, directly to former 
and present security holders of the corporation or its subsidiary instead of to the 
corporation or its subsidiary; and an order requiring the corporation or its subsidiary to 
pay reasonable legal fees incurred by the complainant in connection with the action.”302 
Clearly, a court is not limited in its power to resolve a dispute involving derivative 
actions. 
Derivative action is an extremely important right or remedy for a minority 
shareholder. It provides one of only a few possible ways that the minority can protect 
him/herself and a corporation from managers and majority shareholders, that is, to resist 
or oppose the deficiency of corporate personality and majority rules. Derivative action 
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also prevents directors from abusing their right, and forces management to act in the best 
interest of a corporation, rather than merely in its own interest or the interest of the 
majority. Bruce Welling calls it a “statutory representative action” and describes it as “the 
minority shareholder’s sword to the majority’s twin shields of corporate personality and 
majority rule.”303 Thus, it will be very useful to implement such a remedy in the civil law 
countries. As well, those of them, like Germany, that have something similar to 
derivative action, should pay attention to the use of this remedy from the common law 
perspective. Basically, derivative action, which is outlined in the CBCA, should be an 
example to emulate for civil law countries. Moreover, the right to bring a derivative 
action has to be explicitly stipulated in statutes. The statute must foresee the possibility 
for the plaintiff to bring a derivative action if several conditions are met. First, a 
complainant should be a shareholder, regardless of the number of shares he or she holds. 
Second, the director must be notified before a derivative action is brought. Third, a 
director should act in good faith and in the best interest of the corporation.   
To increase the chances of using such a remedy, civil law statutes must clearly 
specify that a complainant is not required to give security for costs in any application 
made or action brought under the derivative action. Furthermore, the interim costs can be 
paid to the complainant by a corporation, if a court order to do this. Adopted in this way, 
this will make it likely to protect minority shareholders against the majority and 
management, and maintain a balance between them.   
                                                 




4.4 Oppression Remedy 
One of the most powerful weapons for the protection of the rights and interests of 
minority shareholders in Canada is the oppression remedy. If an act or omission is carried 
out in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or if it unfairly disregards the 
interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer, the court may make an order 
to rectify the matter.304 The oppression remedy is “the broadest, most comprehensive and 
most open-ended shareholder remedy in the common law world”.305 It is hard to disagree 
with this view. 
Many judges have tried to define “oppressive,” “unfairly prejudicial” and 
“unfairly disregards.” But in the end, it all comes down to one major question: “Is the 
conduct unfair to the shareholder?”306 In other words, the general ground for bringing an 
action under s.241 CBCA is “unfairness”. Thus “fairness” or “unfairness” is the “main” 
standard by which judges decide the presence or absence of oppression. This position was 
confirmed in Westfair v Watt307: “I see no significant difference between the grounds in s. 
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241. They are identical and duplicative, and this superfluity is not an aid to 
interpretation”308.  
However, “fairness” is also a very subjective, broad and ambiguous notion. That 
is why Canadian courts and scholars come up with the concept of “reasonable 
expectation,” 309  according to which the presence or absence of oppression is now 
assessed in Canada. In Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries Ltd, 310  Lord Wilberforce 
expressed this significant principle thus “[a] limited company is more than a mere 
judicial entity, with a personality in law of its own: that there is room in company law for 
recognition of the fact that behind it, or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, 
expectations and obligations inter se which are not necessarily submerged in the 
company structure”311. The prevalence of the “reasonable expectation” principle has been 
supported by the Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Poonam Puri in their paper,312 where they write 
that an “important result of the judicial application of the oppression remedy has been the 
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development of a test of reasonable expectation of shareholders, which must be taken into 
account by the management and other shareholders”313. 
This new approach enlarged the chances for an oppressed person to protect 
himself or herself. Moreover, it is significant that “reasonable expectation” encompasses 
situations that do not violate strict legal principles, but are inconsistent with the 
reasonable expectations of the parties.314 In other words, the applicant is able to bring a 
claim even if the action of the director or majority is lawful, but unfair315. This remedy is 
focused “on concepts of fairness and equity rather than on legal rights.”316 
In the recent BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders case, the Supreme Court of 
Canada summarized the Canadian position regarding using the oppression remedy and 
gave understandable conduct recommendations on employing it. The court clearly said 
that it is impossible to “catalogue exhaustively situations where a reasonable expectation 
may arise due to their fact-specific nature”317. However, the Supreme Court pointed out 
that some factors should be taken into account when considering the existence or absence 
of reasonable expectation. They include general commercial practice, the nature of the 
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corporation, the relationship between the parties, past practice, steps the claimant could 
have taken to protect itself, representations and agreements and the fair resolution of 
conflicting interests between corporate stakeholders.318    
It is important to note that supporting only the reasonable expectation requirement 
in an oppression claim is not enough. It means that not all conduct that is harmful to a 
shareholder will automatically give rise to the possibility of seeking the oppression 
remedy. The complainant has to show that the reasonable expectation was violated by the 
conduct falling within the term “oppression,” “unfair prejudice” or “unfair disregard” of a 
relevant interest. In more detail, the Supreme Court of Canada held: 
The reasonable expectations analysis that is the theoretical foundation of 
the oppression remedy, and the particular types of conduct described in s. 
241, may be seen as complementary, rather than representing alternative 
approaches to the oppression remedy, as has sometimes been supposed. 
Together, they offer a complete picture of conduct that is unjust and 
inequitable, to return to the language of Ebrahimi.319 
The original wrong recognized in the cases was described simply as oppression. 
This notion is generally associated with conduct that has been described in different 
manners, such as "burdensome, harsh and wrongful" 320 , “a visible departure from 
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standards of fair dealing,”321 or “abuse of power”322. It is wrongs of such nature that gave 
the remedy its name and which is now generally used to cover all claims under s.241. 
However, this term also stipulates a particular type of injury, which is a wrong of the 
most serious sort.323  
Regarding the term “unfair prejudice” the courts expressed the following position: 
"unfair prejudice" is generally seen as involving conduct less offensive 
than "oppression". Examples include squeezing out a minority shareholder, 
failing to disclose related party transactions, changing corporate structure 
to drastically alter debt ratios, adopting a "poison pill" to prevent a 
takeover bid, paying dividends without a formal declaration, preferring 
some shareholders with management fees and paying directors' fees higher 
than the industry norm.324 
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Canada held that “"unfair disregard" is 
viewed as the least serious of the three injuries, or wrongs, mentioned in s. 241. 
Examples include favoring a director by failing to properly prosecute claims, improperly 
reducing a shareholder's dividend, or failing to deliver property belonging to the 
claimant”.325 
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It is important to note the fact that CBCA provides the possibility of bringing an 
oppression claim to a variety of applicants. Pursuant to Section 238, the term 
“complainant” means a registered holder or beneficial owner, or a former registered 
holder or beneficial owner, of a security of a corporation or any of its affiliates, a director 
or an officer or a former director or officer of a corporation or any of its affiliates, the 
Director, or any other person who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make 
an application under the remedy. It is clear that shareholders, whether majority or 
minority, are proper complainants to bring an application against oppression. 
It is also significant that the major difference between derivative action and the 
oppression remedy is that in a derivative action, the complainant seeks the best interests 
of the corporation and does not pursue any personal interest or the interest of a specific 
group. In contrast, the oppression remedy is initiated by a person or a group of persons 
pursuing a personal interest in the corporation and trying to get a personal benefit from 
the action326. This is one of the major reasons the oppression remedy is less complicated 
in its application, because to prove that an alleged interest is in the best interest of the 
corporation is very complicated.  
As with derivative action, in an application against oppression, the court is 
authorized to “make any interim or final order it thinks fit.”327 However, the breadth of a 
court’s broad discretion is restricted in some ways. First, a court shall apply the “general 
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principle of equity”328. This is supported by the Dickerson Committee which proposed 
that “the courts should have very broad discretion, applying general standards of fairness, 
to decide these cases on their merits”329. The second restriction is that the court shall use 
its power to correct or rectify the situation. Thus, in Naneff v. Con-Crete Holding Ltd,330 
in which the court held that “broad as that discretion is, however, it can only be exercised 
for a very specific purpose; that is, to rectify the oppression.” 331  An even more 
demonstrative assertion is found in the case 820099 Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard 
Ltd., where the Ontario Court of Justice held: 
The court should not interfere with the affairs of a corporation lightly. I 
think that where relief is justified to correct an oppressive type of situation, 
the surgery should be done with a scalpel, and not a battle axe. I would 
think that this principle would hold true even if the past conduct of the 
oppressor were found to be scandalous. The job for the court is to even up 
the balance, not tip it in favour of the hurt party332. 
Clearly, Canadian scholars and judiciary have evolved a mechanism to prevent 
abuse from the broad power of a court, by stating that the court has to rectify the dispute. 
Seen as mainly contrived to protect minority shareholders in a closely-held 
corporation, this remedy solves their financial predicament as a complainant is not 
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required to give security for costs in any application made or action brought, or 
intervention under this remedy. 333  Furthermore, the court can at any time order the 
corporation or its subsidiary to pay to the complainant interim costs, including legal fees 
and disbursements. 
Nowadays, the oppression remedy is one of the best means to protect the interest 
of minority shareholders in Canada. The empirical study of Stephanie Ben-Ishai and 
Poonam Puri concluded that this remedy is preferred by most shareholders, compared 
with other remedies, for the purpose of benefitting minority shareholders in closely-held 
corporations. The cases also show that in Canada minority shareholders prefer to use the 
oppression remedy, rather than derivative action. This may be on account of the broad 
scope of the oppression remedy, and the idea that it does not have a strong connection to 
the directors’ fiduciary duties, making it easier to prove in court. In other words, 
shareholders are more motivated to use the oppression remedy because, according to 
statistics, they have better chances of winning these cases. They may also prefer to use it 
because it does not necessarily require showing a breach of law or rights, as this remedy 
provides that shareholders can make an application against oppression also in the 
situation where there is no breach of law, but this action contradicts or breaks the 
complainant’s reasonable expectation.  Finally, shareholders prefer to use the oppression 
remedy because it protects their own interests and not the company’s. Reimbursement 
will not go to the company, but to them. 
                                                 




Ukraine and Germany are not familiar with the oppression remedy. On this score, 
it is significant to note that many problems in corporate administration, which cannot be 
solved, or can hardly be solved in civil law countries can, theoretically and practically, be 
resolved for the benefit of shareholders and a corporation itself in common law countries 
by using the oppression remedy. Examples include squeezing out a minority shareholder, 
failing to disclose related party transactions, changing the corporate structure to 
drastically alter debt ratios, adopting a "poison pill" to prevent a takeover bid, paying 
dividends without a formal declaration, preferring some shareholders with management 
fees and paying directors' fees higher than the industry norm, failing to properly 
prosecute claims, improperly reducing a shareholder's dividend or distribution of all the 
profit as salaries for majority shareholders, hiring the majority’s relatives or trusted 
persons to receive “kickback,” or failing to deliver property belonging to the claimant. 
This is not a full list of examples where the minority can successfully protect his/her 
interest. Corporate law is developing very fast, thus the “broad remedy” that can be 
employed in many situations is the key to protect oppressed parties and improve the 
attractiveness of conducting of business, which will positively reflect on the stakeholders 
and society. Indeed, the significance of the remedy, is captured in the following words: 
[B]eyond question, [the oppression remedy is] the broadest, most 
comprehensive and most open-ended shareholder remedy in the common 
law world. It is unprecedented in its scope. It is being applied to a wide 
variety of situations in both public and private companies, and, most 




that the legislatures have given them to fashion remedies for shareholders 
who complain that they have been dealt with unfairly.334  
4.5 Cumulative Voting 
As already mentioned, a cumulative voting mechanism provides the possibility to 
elect, at least, one “minority director.” Furthermore, this is the only way for the minority 
to participate in the management of the company because, in this situation, a director who 
is elected by the minority will, at least, take into consideration the interests of the 
minority. Many countries assume cumulative voting as a compulsory type of voting when 
electing directors; usually they are the countries with robust minority shareholder’s 
protection policy. Others do not provide compulsory cumulative voting, however do not 
prohibit this kind of voting.335 In countries where cumulative voting is not compulsory in 
the case of the election of directors, it is unlikely that the majority will include it in the 
articles of association. Power sharing is rarely accepted, and this is a major reason not to 
include cumulative voting in the articles.  
As Kevin McGuiness explains, “Cumulative voting is a system of voting under 
which each elector has a number of votes determined by reference to the number of 
officers that are to be filled by election, with the elector being free to distribute those 
votes among such number of persons or concentrate those votes on any one person, as the 
elector may see fit”336. Under cumulative voting, “each shareholder is entitled to vote at 
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an election of directors, has the right to cast a number of votes equal to the number of 
votes attached to the shares held by the shareholder multiplied by the number of directors 
to be elected, and may cast all of those votes in favor of one candidate or distribute them 
among the candidates in any manner.”337  
This procedure works in the following way. Shareholders have to elect 3 directors, 
for example. The first shareholder has 100 votes, the second 50 and the third 25 
respectively. Under simple majority voting, the shareholder who has 100 votes will elect 
all directors, because he/she has more shares than the other two together and his/her votes 
constitute more than 50 per cent. Employing cumulative voting, however, the minority 
could elect, at least, one director. In our case, according to cumulative voting, the first 
shareholder has 300 votes, the second 150 votes, and the third 75 votes (number of votes 
multiplied by the number of directors to be elected).  If the second and third cast all of 
their votes in favor of one director, this candidate will likely become a director. Thus, it is 
apparent in this example that with the same conditions (the same number of shareholders 
and appointed directors), the result can be totally different depending on the kind of 
voting adopted.  
Based on the above, it is reasonable to propose that regarding the procedure of 
election of directors, cumulative voting should be compulsory, unless otherwise 
stipulated in the unanimous shareholders agreement, or as passed by a special resolution 
of the 3/4 majority.  This provision will prevent the majority from abusing minority 
shareholders and create some balance between the minority and the majority, though the 
                                                 




majority will still prevail in decisions regarding the affairs of the company. Employing 
compulsory cumulative voting will maintain the prevailing interest and status of the 
majority and “Majority Rules,” but it will give the minority the chance to elect a “right 
director” who, likely, will support their positions. Moreover, this director will be a 
minority’s “watchdog” and will control the majority and other directors.  
This kind of voting cannot solve all the problems that arise in corporate 
relationships, but it can at least increase the chances for minority shareholders to 
participate in the management of the corporation and, consequently, enhance the 
protection of minority rights.  
 
4.6 Obstacles to Implementing Common Law Remedies in a Civil Law 
System 
The recommendations to implement some remedies from common law countries 
in civil law countries, such as Germany and Ukraine, will not be complete without 
analyzing obstacles which can arise in regard to their adoption. Unfortunately, there is a 
shortage of literature regarding these issues; as such, the views put across in this part 
mainly reflect the author’s analysis. It is common knowledge that common law and civil 
law systems have many similarities and differences. Consequently, some institutions, 
remedies and procedures which perfectly fit and work in one system, can be useless or 
unviable in the other system. A good example is trust. In the common law world, this 




continental world, many countries have tried to create something similar to trust, but it 
either does not work at all, or it does not work in the same manner as in common law 
countries. For example, Germany, Ukraine and France do not stipulate the trust as a 
corporation, but foresee the possibility to create fiduciary management in regard to this 
on the basis of contract, not a corporation.338 However, because the civil law does not 
foresee split property, this institution cannot work for reason of the security of assets. 
This is because the settler remains an owner. In the case of bankruptcy, seizure of the 
property transferred into a fiduciary management upon the claim of the management 
settler’s creditor is allowed, the property management agreement is terminated, and the 
property is included in the bankruptcy estate339. Again, the trust does not work in most 
civil law countries in the case of inheritance, because of the civil law’s conception of 
private property. The only civil law country that has largely adopted Anglo-Saxon trust 
legislation is Liechtenstein. However, being a civil law jurisdiction, trust assets are 
vulnerable to forced heirship provisions, although there are time limitations on such 
claims.340 In light of these examples, it is necessary to consider whether it is possible to 
adopt the above-mentioned remedies in the civil law countries to protect minority 
shareholders. 
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As Alan Watson has noted, while “[t]he act of borrowing is usually simple … 
build[ing] up a theory of borrowing, on the other hand, seems to be an extremely 
complex matter.”341 It is complex because to be crowned with success,342 an imported 
rule should fit into its new environment at the micro and macro levels. Micro-fit means 
“how well the imported rule complements the preexisting legal infrastructure in the host 
country.” 343  Macro-fit is “how well the imported rule complements the preexisting 
institutions of political economy in the host country.”344 The success or failure of legal 
adoption (transplant) varies over time and largely depends on the degree to which the 
adoption (transplant) “fits the prevailing legal and non-legal infrastructure of which it is a 
part.”345 The more it fits, the more chances that the imported rule, principle or institution 
will work in the host country as it works in the donor country. 
The first institution that may be usefully implemented in legislation is cumulative 
voting. There are no serious theoretical, conceptual, practical and financial obstacles to 
adopting this kind of voting. This institution fits on both the micro and macro levels in 
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any new jurisdiction of corporate governance and management regulation. Moreover, as 
mentioned in previous chapters, cumulative voting is not prohibited in the majority346 of 
civil law countries, hence it can be easily implemented into legislation. Indeed, to protect 
the minority shareholder by giving him/her a more viable opportunity to elect, at least, 
some director, a government must change legislation and endorse compulsory cumulative 
voting for electing directors. 
Concerning derivative action, to adopt such a remedy will not contradict existing 
civil law theory. More importantly, it can easily be used in practice. This remedy could 
bring some balance among the weight of interests of the minority, majority and the 
corporation itself. Furthermore, this remedy is also based on common sense: if a majority 
with a director does not act in the best interests of a corporation, there is no reason why 
the minority should be unable to bring a lawsuit.  Implementation of derivative action 
will also not upset the balance of power between the majority and minority. It means that 
if a minority does not act in good faith, civil law theory accommodates counter-claim, 
which will serve as a safeguard against abuse of the power to bring a derivative action. 
Thus, stipulating derivative action in legislation will be enough to implement this remedy 
and increase minority shareholder protection. However, implementation should be systemic. 
First of all, legislation must explicitly say that in the case of a derivative action, shareholders 
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act as representatives of a corporation and not as complainants347. This is because class 
(collective) lawsuits are not recognized in most civil law countries. Moreover, according to 
Ukrainian law, for example, a person who acts on behalf of someone and in the interests of 
someone is a representative. Thus, the civil law countries recognize only one complainant. 
There cannot be more than one complainant according to civil law court procedures. It is 
possible to bring a lawsuit against many respondents, but not by many complainants.  In this 
case, a complainant should be a corporation, because this remedy is devised primarily to 
protect the interests of a corporation. Second, statutes must stipulate that interim costs should 
be reimbursed to shareholders by the corporation. Again, this is because this action is in the 
interests of a corporation, and shareholders are only representatives. Finally, the statute must 
foresee the possibility for shareholders to bring a derivative action if several conditions 
are met. First, the director must be notified before a derivative action is brought. Second, 
a shareholder should act in good faith and in the best interest of the corporation. 
The implementation of the common law director’s duties, the duty of care and 
fiduciary duties, and oppression remedy in civil law legislation, is more complex. It 
requires making deliberate decisions and taking gradual steps. It is not enough just to 
“put” (stipulate) some provision regarding director duties and the oppression remedy in 
the legislation. Such a provision will not work for the following reasons. First, the 
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common law director’s duties have a centuries-old history of development and, most 
importantly, utilization. Second, the duties, and the oppression remedy were developed, 
and are still being developed mainly by the judiciary. As generally known, courts in civil 
law countries have less power; they cannot interpret laws, and their decisions do not have 
binding force for other parties. Third, the oppression remedy in common law countries 
encompasses situations that do not violate strict legal principles, but are inconsistent with 
the reasonable expectations of the parties348. In other words, the applicant is able to bring 
a claim even if the action of the director or majority is lawful, but unfair349. This position 
is inadmissible in a civil law world. Continental law has several basic principles which a 
previous sentence breaches. In civil law countries, the main principle in private law, to 
which the regime of corporate law belongs, is that a person can do everything not 
prohibited by the law350 . Consequently, if an action is not prohibited, everyone can 
perform it. The second principle, which flows from the first one, provides that a person 
can seek help in court only if his/her right is violated. If the action is not prohibited (first 
principle), then it is lawful and, consequently, the action cannot breach someone’s right 
(second principle), and so a person does not have a right to apply to court. Another 
general rule is that a person can only be liable if there is evidence that can confirm the 
guilt, damage and cause-effect relationship in issue. Guilt is required to prove breach of 
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some rules (laws). Thus, the general rule regarding the liability of a person also 
contradicts adoption of the principle of “reasonable expectation” in the oppression 
remedy. Fourth, the power of the court must be explicitly defined in a civil law system 
because of the principle of public law which allows exercising only powers specified in 
law351. In other words, statutes have to provide the full list of powers with which the 
court is vested. Hence, the formulation of the power of a court to “make any order it 
thinks fit”352 is, to say the least, incorrect in a civil law system and cannot be used in this 
manner. 
In the case of fiduciary duties, it can be asserted that, theoretically and practically, 
they can be implemented in civil law countries, though not easily. Indeed, a lot of work 
must precede the transplantation of the duties into civil law. The experience of Asian 
countries, such as Japan and Taiwan (China), can serve as instructive examples of how to 
implement the common law institutions in civil law countries, and which mistakes not to 
repeat. Both of these countries, by and large, “inherited the German law tradition”353. As 
such, their legal systems have many features similar to those of Germany and Ukraine. 
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Taking into consideration Japan’s experience with the duty of loyalty, it can be 
asserted that “even poorly motivated and ill-fitting legal transplant may become a core 
rule in the host country over time, as the legal infrastructure and political economy 
change”354. It must be noted, that Japan needed about four decades to start employing the 
duty of loyalty. The reasons why the duty of loyalty transplant failed for so long time are 
the following. First, the judges and practitioners were not familiar with the use of broad 
legal standards, which differ from narrowly tailored rules. Second, a standard of loyalty 
was not developed in Japan. Under civil law, judges are required to apply comprehensive 
codes mechanically to the cases before them. If a new issue that is not specifically 
covered in an existing code comes before the court, the judge has little discretionary 
power to deal with it, regardless of the judge’s opinions on the matter355. Moreover, court 
decisions in the civil law system are merely seen as a clarification of the existing law356. 
Thus, if a judge is not familiar with the conception of fiduciary duties and with the 
standard of the duty of loyalty, he/she would likely try to avoid to use this standard and, 
instead, try to find some other rules which, somehow, can be used to decide the case. 
Third, judges could not employ remedies against self-dealing in the absence of explicit 
statutory guidance. In other words, a court does not have power to make any order it 
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thinks fit. Fourth, the adoption of the duty of loyalty was wholly motivated by politics. 357 
Some authors, also add that the Japanese legal community itself did not seem concerned 
to implement the duty of loyalty358. To sum up, it can be simply said that Japan was not 
ready for this legal transplantation. More importantly, Japan did not seem to desire to 
adopt this institution at the time of transplant. 
A similar situation arises with regard to Taiwan (The Republic of China). In 2001, 
some amendments were made to its Companies Act.359 The most significant of these was 
the introduction of the common law concept of fiduciary duties. As with Japan, Taiwan 
only introduced a very general concept of the duty of loyalty. Because of this, as 
Professor Christopher Chen Chao-hung observes, there are some fundamentals flaws 
associated with this adoption: 
First, there is no ‘equity’ under Taiwan law. Thus, the fiduciary duties 
must be integrated into the Civil Code and other civil law concepts. 
Second, Taiwan law did not build on the development of case law. Instead, 
once a concept is introduced, judges and practitioners will interpret the 
concepts based on their understanding of the concept rather than on the 
                                                 
357 See, Hedeki Kanda & Curtis J Milhaupt, supra note 339 at 12:Article 254-3 
(duty of loyalty) of the Commercial Code was imported from the US in 1950. … the US 
Occupation authorities in charge of corporate law reform sought inclusion of this 
provision as part of a package of reform designed to improve minority shareholders’ 
rights under the Japanese Commercial Code. 
358 Ibid at 18. 
359  Ministry of Justice, The Companies Act of China, online: Laws and 
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<http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=J0080001>, Article 23: The 
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development of case law in its original source. Third, when introducing 
the loyalty part of the duty, Taiwan law only introduced the ‘concept’ of 
loyalty without any further classification (e.g. self-dealing, corporate 
opportunity, acting for proper purpose, etc.). This point exacerbates the 
previous one because there was no substance to the general ‘duty of 
loyalty’360.  
The biggest problem, which Japan and Taiwan faced, was not being ready for the 
use of the broad standard of loyalty by most of judges, practitioners and scholars. 
However, the examples of Japan and Taiwan show the possibility to implement fiduciary 
duties in the civil law system. The world changes every day, thus the legal theory also has 
to be changed. This means, for instance, that some new conceptions, principles and rules 
should be formulated to take the places of old one. In regard to fiduciary duties, 
implementing them requires making deliberate decisions and taking gradual steps. First, 
before adopting the duty of loyalty, a host country must undertake preparatory work. This 
means that all universities, schools for judges, bar societies, etc., have to start teaching 
about fiduciary duties very seriously. Legal journals, newspaper and news magazines 
must write articles on this topic. In other words, people have to know about these duties 
and start being interested in them. It will take much time, but without this step, the 
institution will develop very slowly, as it was in Japan. It is easier to teach than retrain, 
thus, it is possible that only a new generation of lawyers (judges and practitioners) will 
utilize fiduciary duties in the right way. This happens even now, in Japan and Taiwan, 
when judges consider the duty of loyalty as an integral part of the duty of care361. Second, 
                                                 
360 Christopher Chen Chao-hung, supra note 352 at 3-4. 




the highest court institution in a host country has to issue general elucidations or 
recommendations on what the duty of loyalty is, how to employ it, and in which 
situations. Third, courts should be vested with wider power, than they have in civil law 
countries now. Fourth, judges must adopt the experience on what the duty of loyalty is, 
from many common law countries, and not to blindly copy, for example, the American 
experience. Fifth, many amendments have to be made to the existing law of a host 
country, especially in regard director liability. Sixth, because the civil law judge cannot 
“interpret” the laws like his/her colleague from a common law jurisdiction, the 
monitoring of court decisions from different jurisdictions should be constantly done to 
offer further explanation to judges. By using all of these steps, it will be possible ensure a 
successful transplantation of fiduciary duties into a civil law jurisdiction and, hence, 
protect the rights of shareholders.        
So then, not all the above-mentioned remedies can be easily implemented in civil 
law countries. Problems can arise with fiduciary duties because they are not well 
developed in civil law countries, and because of limitations on the interpretational power 
of the courts, that are the primary forums through which to develop these duties. Also, it 
is almost impossible to adopt the oppression remedy in the same manner that it works in 
common law countries. The “reasonable expectation” principle cannot be fully utilized in 
civil law countries because doing so would violate the main principles of the continental 
law world. Generally speaking, the most unique feature of the oppression remedy, which 
distinguishes it from the other remedies, is the possibility to bring an application against 




acts “unfairly” against the minority. As mentioned, “unfairness” is not recognized in the 
civil law countries as a cause of action. As such, the oppression remedy cannot work at 
full capacity in those countries without substantial conceptual changes. Without these 
changes, the oppression remedy loses its attractiveness. This is because if laws or 
shareholder’s rights are breached, minority shareholders have many remedies to employ. 
Thus, the uniqueness and comprehensiveness of this remedy are lost, making the remedy 
equivalent to a direct action in civil law countries.  In other words, without adopting the 
oppression remedy wholly, or in its entirety with the possibility to apply to a court even 
when there is no breach of law, but only where an action violates reasonable expectation, 
it will not be worth implementing the remedy at all.  
To summarize, to transplant the common law director’s duties and the oppression 
remedy, it would be necessary, first, to make substantial conceptual changes in the 
doctrines of civil law, rather than simply add these institutions to various national 
legislations.  Only after reconsidering some main civil law principles will it be possible to 
adopt these institutions for the benefit of shareholders. Otherwise, implementing these 
institutions (the oppression remedy and the fiduciary duties) into civil law systems will 
not bring positive results for the minority shareholder, simply because their potential to 
bring change will be defeated by their incompatibilities with the theoretical bases of civil 
law.  
Even if this analysis is not foolproof, at least, it achieves its objective, which is to 







For many centuries, scholars from common law and civil law systems have 
argued about which system is better and which is worse. In respect to minority 
shareholder protection, it is possible to assert with confidence that the common law 
system is far ahead of the civil law one. From the author’s experience as a practitioner in 
a civil law country, and from evidence of statistics, judicial practice and legislation, this 
is, sadly, the reality. 
In light of this, it is necessary to implement some institutions or remedies from 
the common law system in the civil law system. However, from the analysis of the 
possibility of implementing remedies from the common law system, the plausible 
conclusion is that not all the remedies can be simply adopted into the civil law system. 
Other institutions or remedies, such as compulsory cumulative voting in the case of the 
election of directors and derivative action, could be implemented in civil law legislation 
without serious impediments.  These last two institutions do not conflict with civil law 
principles and theory. Moreover, adopting them would positively reflect on minority 
shareholder protection. 
Cumulative voting will protect the minority against abuse from majority 
shareholders. It will also safeguard the balance between the minority and majority. Given 
the fact that the majority will still prevail in power in a company, compulsory cumulative 




minority the chance to elect a “right director” who will likely support their views and 
interests. This director will be a minority’s “watchdog” and will control the majority and 
other directors. Overall, cumulative voting will make it more likely for minority 
shareholders to participate in the management of the corporation and, consequently, 
enhance the protection of their rights.  
The derivative action is an extremely important right or remedy for a minority 
shareholder. This is because it is one of only a few possible ways by which such a 
shareholder can protect him/herself and a corporation from managers and majority 
shareholders. In other words, the derivative action resists and opposes the deficiency of 
the corporate personality and the principle of “Majority rules”. The derivative action also 
prevents directors from abusing their rights, and forces management to act in the best 
interest of a corporation, rather than merely in its own interests or in the interests of the 
majority. 
Civil law countries are not familiar with the oppression remedy, which can be 
extremely useful for minority shareholder protection. The broad understanding and 
interpretation of this remedy by legislators and judges gives a right to bring an action in 
different situations and defends against unfair conduct. The positive feature of the 
oppression remedy is the expanded protection it offers not only against the unlawful 
actions of a director or majority shareholders, but also against unjust lawful actions. The 
concept of “reasonable expectation” that the oppression remedy upholds under the 
common law system puts this system ahead, in comparison to civil law countries. 




its incompatibility with its main principles, particularly the ability to bring an action only 
in the situation when a law or a right is breached. In other words, civil law countries do 
not recognize the concept of “fairness” or “unfairness”; consequently all actions which 
are lawful are automatically recognized as legal and fair. Because of this feature, it often 
happens in the civil law that a minority is not able to protect him/herself. These situations 
include diluting shares, changing corporate structure to drastically alter debt ratios, 
paying dividends without a formal declaration, preferring some shareholders with 
management fees or paying directors' fees higher than the industry norm, improperly 
reducing a shareholder's dividend, distributing profit as salaries to majority shareholders, 
or hiring the majority’s relatives or trusted persons in order to receive a “kickback”.  
Almost all these actions are totally within the scope of the law and are respectively not 
prohibited by the law. This is the primary reason a shareholder cannot bring an 
application to a court to protect his/her rights. 
A director’s duties in common law countries are also much more elaborate than in 
civil law countries like Ukraine and Germany. These duties have mainly been elaborated 
by the judiciary, which continues to do so to offer effective protection to the minority 
against management and the majority. In common law countries, the duties of directors 
can simply be defined as having to act in the best interests of the corporation. The best 
interests of the corporation, in our case, mean the interests of the majority and the 
minority. Because of this, minority shareholders feel more protected. For example, if a 
majority approves a decision that totally contradicts the interest of the corporation, the 




minority. However, in civil law countries, a shareholders’ meeting is the supreme organ 
of a corporation, and its decision is compulsory for management to carry out. Failure to 
carry out such a decision means a director breaches his/her duty of obedience, and he/she 
will be liable to suit.  
Though the common law regimes are not perfect in protecting minority 
shareholders, they still offer a good example for the civil law countries to emulate. In the 
end, the recommendations made in this thesis to adopt common law remedies, and to 
think about reconceptualizing relevant foundational principles of the civil law to 
accommodate others, has one purpose. That purpose is to shed some light on how to 
improve corporate governance in the civil law system, and in particular, how to better 
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